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ABSTRACT
It is routinely assumed that there is a trade-off between police
efficiency and the warrant requirement. But existing analysis ignores
the interaction between law-enforcement investigative practices and
criminal innovation. Narrowing the definition of a search or other-
wise limiting the requirement for a warrant gives criminals greater
incentive to innovate to avoid detection. With limited resources to
develop countermeasures, law enforcement officers will often be just
as effective at capturing criminals when facing higher Fourth
Amendment hurdles. We provide a game-theoretic model that shows
that when law-enforcement investigation and criminal innovation
are considered in a dynamic context, the police efficiency rationale for
lowering Fourth Amendment rights is often inapt. We analyze how
this impacts both criminal activity and innocent communications
that individuals seek to keep private in the digital age. We show that
both law-enforcement and noncriminal privacy concerns may be
better promoted by maintaining the warrant requirement.
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INTRODUCTION
“Little” Melvin Williams was an infamous heroin and cocaine
trafficking kingpin in Baltimore in the 1970s and early 1980s.1
When the police began investigating Williams’s operation, they dis-
covered that his gang had taken many ingenious measures to avoid
police detection.2 One such innovation was the invention of a secret
code for pager communications between members of the gang.3 Why
create a special code? Because U.S. Supreme Court doctrine allows
police, without a warrant, to monitor telephone numbers dialed on
the public payphones the gang used to send messages to pagers. The
content of the messages was the telephone number that the
recipient was supposed to call.4 The gang invented a way to mask
the messages that were sent to the pagers—each number was
replaced by the number opposite the “5” on the keypad, and “5” was
replaced with “0.”5
It made sense to invent a code for pager messages and to teach
the code to its members because the gang knew the police could oth-
erwise identify the pager numbers without the cost and evidentiary
burden of acquiring a warrant.6 Law enforcement officers (LEOs)7
1. Ericka Blount, Respect, BALT. MAGAZINE, Sept. 2004, available at http://perma.cc/
8C8R-8LDK.
2. Much of the first season of the HBO drama “The Wire” is based on this investigation.
RAFAEL ALVAREZ, THE WIRE: TRUTH BE TOLD 48 (2009).
3. Id.
4. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (allowing use of a pen register even on a home
telephone).
5. ALVAREZ, supra note 2, at 49.
6. The fact that the police were able to obtain a warrant for the clone beepers does not
mean that they would have been able to obtain a warrant for a pen register on public pay-
phones. Given that the Court in Katz v. United States found that there was a reasonable
expectation of privacy in a public telephone booth being used to make phone calls, a judge
would have been more reluctant to allow surveillance of a public phone, usable by anyone,
than a private beeper used by a suspected criminal. 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967). Even if the
police had met the evidentiary burden for a warrant regarding the payphones, the extra
bureaucratic, political, and time costs imposed by a warrant requirement may have derailed
the investigation at this earlier stage, mitigating the incentive for a secret code.
7. Our analysis applies to policing at all levels, including federal agents, so we use the
general term law enforcement officer. When discussing the common assumption that law-
enforcement investigations are aided by lax or no warrant requirements, however, we use the
term Police Efficiency Assumption, consistent with most judicial analyses on the topic. See,
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are more likely to use investigative techniques like tracking tele-
phone calls when they can avoid the costs of obtaining a warrant.
When LEOs are not bound by the warrant requirement, the expec-
ted benefits of an investigation (the possibility of finding evidence)
are more likely to outweigh its costs (the time and effort expended
by investigation). But when faced with a higher likelihood that law
enforcement will investigate their crimes, criminals have a greater
incentive to try to cover up each crime: in other words, to innovate.
That criminal innovation, inspired by law enforcement’s ability to
investigate without a warrant, may slow down an investigation as
much as the warrant requirement. The Williams gang’s innovation
made the LEO investigation much more difficult because the police
had to create “clone” pagers, which shared the same telephone
numbers as the gang members’ pagers.8 The police were eventually
able to crack the code, but the innovation significantly delayed the
police investigation, and could easily have derailed it entirely.9
Today, instead of pager codes, criminal conspiracies commonly
use prepaid cell phones for communication10 because those devices
are harder for LEOs to trace or to tie to specific people.11 Prepaid
phones are inexpensive, allowing criminals to dispose of them fre-
quently to avoid being linked to the calls made.12 They are also more
difficult to trace because purchasers can provide false names and
addresses to phone providers.13 But inventing pager codes and
purchasing prepaid cell phones are only two of the many actions
criminals can take to avoid being identified. Even casual observers
of detective stories and crime capers will be familiar with many oth-
er mechanisms of classic crime detection avoidance. Bank robbers
e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014). When appropriate, we differentiate
between police and other LEOs because, as discussed later in this Section, some policing will
be more reactive, and thus less amenable to a strategy of countermeasures than others.
8. A process that did itself require warrants.
9. ALVAREZ, supra note 2, at 48-49 (describing the process of breaking the beeper code).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 775 (6th Cir. 2012) (describing a
criminal conspiracy to transport hundreds of pounds of marijuana from Arizona to Tennessee
utilizing prepaid throwaway cell phones).
11. Eoghan Casey & Benjamin Turnbull, Digital Evidence on Mobile Devices, in DIGITAL
EVIDENCE AND COMPUTER CRIME 1, 6 (3d ed. 2011); Toine Spapens, Interaction Between
Criminal Groups and Law Enforcement: The Case of Ecstasy in the Netherlands, 12 GLOBAL
CRIME 19, 28-29 (2011).
12. See Casey & Turnbull, supra note 11, at 6.
13. Spapens, supra note 11, at 28-29.
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use masks to prevent identification by witnesses, burglars use
gloves to hide their fingerprints, and gunmen use silencers so that
their crimes do not attract attention.14
In the digital age, many forms of sophisticated detection avoid-
ance have been developed, from simple steps such as anonymous
e-mail accounts, to complex encryption of computer programs to
mask the content of computer files and Internet activity, to convol-
uted rerouting of internet traffic to avoid location identification. For
example, the reopened “Silk Road” Internet marketplace, which
serves as an online black market, primarily for illegal drugs,15 has
multiple mechanisms to avoid law-enforcement investigations.
Users are required to install the Tor network, a software system
that facilitates anonymity by rerouting IP addresses behind
firewalls and using multiple layers of encryption.16 Only the unreg-
ulated electronic currency “Bitcoin” is accepted,17 and sellers are
required to delete all unique buyer information after confirmation
of an item’s arrival.18 All of these mechanisms provide additional
assurances of anonymity.
Clearly, criminal innovations can take many forms, including new
business methods as well as traditional masking techniques.
Innovations are costly in time and effort but are undertaken be-
cause they reduce the likelihood that criminal participants will be
caught. The possibility of warrantless investigations intensifies
these behaviors. For example, some of the Silk Road innovations are
designed specifically to avoid warrantless law-enforcement investi-
gations. LEOs need only a subpoena—not a warrant backed by
probable cause—to install the computer equivalent of a pen register,
which allows them to track “the to/from address of [a suspect’s] e-
mail messages, the IP addresses of the websites that [a suspect]
14. For more examples of these behaviors, see Jacob Nussim & Avraham D. Tabbach,
Controlling Avoidance: Ex Ante Regulation Versus Ex Post Punishment, 4 REV. L. & ECON. 45,
45 (2008). 
15. Emma Moore, Online Subterfuge: Silk Road, Tor and Bitcoins, BROWN POL. REV. (Nov.
13, 2013, 11:00 AM), http://www.brownpoliticalreview.org/2013/11/online-subterfuge-silk-road-
tor-and-bitcoins/ [http://perma.cc/B2U2-SF7U].
16. Silk Road—An Overview of the Online Marketplace, SILK ROAD DRUGS (Apr. 18, 2013),
http://silkroaddrugs.org/silkroad-drugs-complete-step-by-step-guide/ [http://perma.cc/F2PW-
4RQZ].
17. Id.
18. See Moore, supra note 15.
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visited and the total volume of information sent to or from [a
suspect’s Internet] account.”19 The National Security Agency (NSA)
can, without a warrant, analyze identifying information, such as IP
addresses, in communications between Americans and foreigners
and can search its massive databases of communications data—
some of it solely domestic—for the identifying information of specific
individuals.20 The Silk Road’s built-in protections from such war-
rantless investigatory powers make the job of investigators much
more difficult—perhaps as difficult as it would be if the warrant
requirement were applied to tracking IP addresses.21
Local police and federal agents often undertake large-scale,
sometimes multiyear, multiagency investigations that involve a
back-and-forth between criminal innovation and law-enforcement
counterresponse. This is illustrated by the international tracking
and capture of Joaquín Guzmán Loera, also known as “El Chapo,”
chief of the world’s biggest drug-trafficking cartel, Sinaloa in
Mexico, who was involved in a combination of high-tech and low-
tech criminal innovation.22 Guzmán evaded the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), Mexican intelligence, and special forces,
among other agencies, for eight years by using both sophisticated
encryption programs and simple avoidance of direct phone conver-
sations, combined with a complicated system of intermediaries and
relays: 
If you needed to communicate with the boss, you could reach him
via B.B.M., BlackBerry’s instant-messaging application.... Your
message would go not directly to Guzmán, however, but to a
19. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 505 (9th Cir. 2007).
20. James Ball & Spencer Ackerman, NSA Loophole Allows Warrantless Search for U.S.
Citizens’ E-mails and Phone Calls, GUARDIAN (Aug. 9, 2013, 12:08 PM), http://www.
theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/09/nsa-loophole-warrantless-searches-email-calls [http://
perma.cc/AQN9-KRAJ].
21. Although investigators were able to take down the original Silk Road and arrest
multiple people involved in the market, including its leader, Ross Ulbricht, they did so
through old-fashioned (non-cyber) police work, lucky breaks (such as a Postal Inspector’s
detection of illegal substances in a package), and exploiting one amateurish mistake by
Ulbricht. Kim Zetter, How the Feds Took Down the Silk Road Drug Wonderland, WIRED (Nov.
18, 2013, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2013/11/silk-road/ [http://perma.cc/C9KC-LENJ].
22. Patrick Radden Keefe, The Hunt for El Chapo: How the World’s Most Notorious Drug
Lord Was Captured, NEW YORKER (May 5, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/
2014/05/05/the-hunt-for-el-chapo [http://perma.cc/3LH8-SU5Z].
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trusted lieutenant, who spent his days in Starbucks coffee shops
and other locations with public wireless networks. Upon
receiving the message, the lieutenant would transcribe it onto an
iPad, so that he could forward the text using WiFi—avoiding the
cellular networks that the cartel knew the authorities were trol-
ling. The transcribed message would be sent not to Guzmán but
to a second intermediary, who, also using a tablet and public
WiFi, would transcribe the words onto his BlackBerry and relay
them to Guzmán. Although Guzmán continued to use a Black-
Berry, it was almost impossible to track, because it communi-
cated with only one other device.23
This “mirror” system was almost impossible for the authorities to
penetrate, but by studying the patterns of the cartel’s communica-
tions, the DEA was able to locate Guzmán’s intermediaries, and
eventually physically locate him at the home of a coconspirator.24
From balaclavas to computer encryption, all of these criminal
behaviors decrease, to a greater or lesser extent, the probability that
LEOs will find evidence linking an individual to a crime. In this
Article, we consider all such measures under the general concept of
“criminal innovation.” These are actions that take place prior to a
criminal’s arrest to avoid identification, as opposed to actions taken
following an arrest to avoid conviction, such as influencing wit-
nesses or consulting experts.25
Most forms of criminal innovation are uninteresting to analyze
because due to their low cost and large benefit, criminals will have
a clear incentive to make use of them, and law enforcement can do
little to counteract their effectiveness. For a criminal robbing a
bank, wearing a mask is obviously an optimal choice because this
tool of innovation is easy to obtain, inexpensive, and will make it
much more difficult for witnesses to identify the robber. Police can
do little to lift such a veil. That does not mean that police do not
innovate to counteract criminal innovation, but most street policing
is reactive, and countermeasures are generally developed at the
policy level, rather than in response to specific criminal behavior.
Criminal innovation and law-enforcement countermeasures become
23. Id.
24. Id. Guzmán temporarily escaped through a system of hidden tunnels before being
captured shortly thereafter. Id.
25. See Nussim & Tabbach, supra note 14.
766 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:759
more interesting when considering marginal innovations, which
criminals will make only in some situations. For example, it only
makes sense to use prepaid cell phones if the decreased likelihood
of law-enforcement detection outweighs the added cost of their use.
Likewise, developing and implementing high-tech encryption pro-
grams is costly and time consuming, and only worthwhile as long as
the criminal stays one step ahead of LEO countermeasures.26 It is
obvious that criminals will want to innovate, but because innovation
is often costly, the interesting question is this: When will innovation
be worthwhile?
We show that a major factor in that calculation is whether the
warrant requirement applies to law-enforcement countermeasures.
When policing is not simply reactive to immediate instances of
criminal behavior, but involves longer-term investigation, such as
when federal agents take on high-level drug and gun rings, the
Fourth Amendment generally requires LEOs to obtain a warrant
before conducting a search, which requires probable cause,27 or even
higher evidence of criminality.28 But the courts do not consider
many types of law enforcement activity to be searches for Fourth
Amendment purposes, and so LEOs do not need to obtain warrants
to act.29 For instance, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recently
held that tracking a suspect’s movements via his cell phone data
was not a “search” for Fourth Amendment purposes, and so the
26. For descriptions of the recent “encryption wars” between LEOs and criminals in the
United States and the United Kingdom, see Sophie Curtis, National Crime Agency Wages War
on Tor “Darknet” Anonymity, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 10, 2013, 3:23 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.
uk/technology/internet-security/10369880/National-Crime-Agency-wages-war-on-Tor-darknet-
anonymity.html [http://perma.cc/FE5V-SQHW]; and Zachary Graves, The NSA’s War Against
Encryption, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 10, 2013, 2:48 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
zachary-graves/the-nsas-war-against-encr_b_3901328.html [http://perma.cc/XV9F-TCQS].
27. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (“When the right of privacy
must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not
by a policeman.”).
28. For instance, an application for electronic surveillance under Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Wiretap Act), 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (2012), “must
contain a statement affirming that normal investigative procedures have been tried and
failed, are reasonably unlikely to succeed if tried, or are too dangerous to employ.” See U.S.
ATTORNEYS’ CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL 28 (2012), available at http://perma.cc/TQ8H-PYD2.
29. In general, a police investigation is a search if it violates an individual’s “reasonable
expectation of privacy.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring); see Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 746 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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warrant requirement did not apply.30 If the police can ping a cell
phone or track it using a Global Positioning System (GPS) without
going through the effort of obtaining a warrant, they will be more
likely to so investigate. An enterprising criminal will therefore have
greater incentive to innovate in order to prevent this type of invest-
igation from succeeding by buying prepaid phones without GPS
technology,31 altering the phones to prevent tracking through ping-
ing, or turning to masked electronic communications. Investigation
of crime is a constant back-and-forth between criminal innovation
and law-enforcement countermeasures—an “arms race” between
criminal innovation and police counterresponse.32
We challenge the assumption that requiring LEOs to obtain a
warrant prior to undertaking a particular action will always make
law-enforcement investigations and prosecutions more difficult.
Often, perhaps even usually, not needing a warrant will be better
for law enforcement for obvious reasons: officers must expend time
and effort to obtain the warrant; the warrant process may create
delays that allow for the destruction or concealment of evidence; and
having to show probable cause to obtain the warrant means that
some investigations will be blocked altogether.33 However, because
criminals can innovate, the assumption of greater law-enforcement
efficiency in the absence of the warrant requirement can be wrong.34
When LEOs do not need a warrant, they will be more likely—all
other things being equal—to investigate because the costs of invest-
igation are lower.35 However, this lowered cost of investigation will
incentivize criminals to innovate more often because innovations
lower the likelihood of detection in the event of law-enforcement
30. United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 777 (6th Cir. 2012).
31. See Orin Kerr, Sixth Circuit Rules That Pinging a Cell Phone to Determine Its Location
Is Not a Fourth Amendment “Search,” VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 14, 2012, 2:02 PM), http://
www.volokh.com/2012/08/14/sixth-circuit-rules-that-pinging-a-cell-phone-to-determine-its-
location-is-not-a-fourth-amendment-search/ [http://perma.cc/CN42-FURX] (discussing whether
the warrant requirement applies to nonprepaid phones). 
32. Nina Totenberg, Weighing the Risks of Warrantless Phone Searches During Arrests,
NPR (Apr. 29, 2014, 3:14 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2014/04/29/
306262746/weighing-the-risks-of-warrantless-phone-searches-during-arrests [http://perma.
cc/6HLM-VB4Z] (describing police attempts to search cell phones before arrestees’ co-conspira-
tors remote wipe the devices).
33. See infra Part I.B.
34. See infra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
35. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
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investigation.36 In many cases, the gains to LEOs from not having
to obtain a warrant will be offset by a decreased likelihood of finding
evidence due to increased criminal innovation. We show that abol-
ishing or lowering the warrant requirement will often lead criminals
to innovate more regularly, making law-enforcement investigations
less likely to succeed. LEOs will not increase their rate of investiga-
tion and will not capture more criminals.
One means by which the courts avoid the warrant requirement is
by narrowing the range of law-enforcement activities that are
considered “searches,” eliminating the application of the Fourth
Amendment to those investigations. A Fourth Amendment search
only occurs, and thus a warrant is only required, if LEOs violate an
individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.”37 The reasonable
expectation of privacy test has been derided as circular38 because an
expectation of privacy will depend on the extent to which police
regularly breach that expectation;39 moreover, expectations of priv-
acy will depend on legal decisions, which are supposed to be based
on people’s expectations of privacy.40 This circularity can lead to a
spiral of ever-decreasing Fourth Amendment rights whereby
increased government surveillance erodes people’s privacy expecta-
tions, making the surveillance legal under the test. Though such a
downward spiral decreases the rights of everyone, including
noncriminals, it is usually considered at least to have the beneficial
36. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. This logic does not assume that criminals
will know when LEOs have or have not obtained a warrant, but rather that criminals will
know when LEOs do and do not need to obtain warrants to gather information relevant to
their criminal conduct. Although in some cases criminals will be ignorant of the law, many
criminal conspiracies will be aware of the extent that the warrant requirement gives them
greater protection, and thus greater latitude, as the initial Williams example illustrated.
37. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
38. See, e.g., Richard H. Seamon, Kyllo v. United States and the Partial Ascendance of
Justice Scalia’s Fourth Amendment, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 1013, 1023-24 (2001) (“Under the test,
the less privacy we have ... the less we can reasonably expect. As our reasonable expectations
of privacy decrease, the types of government intrusions that will be found to fall outside of the
Fourth Amendment (as not constituting searches) increases.”).
39. Tonja Jacobi, The Law and Economics of the Exclusionary Rule, 87 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 585, 664 (2011) (“[W]hether an expectation of privacy exists will itself depend on the
extent to which police regularly breach that expectation.”).
40. Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979
SUP. CT. REV. 173, 188 (“[I]t is circular to say that there is no invasion of privacy unless the
individual whose privacy is invaded had a reasonable expectation of privacy; whether he will
or will not have such an expectation will depend on what the legal rule is.”).
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effect of making it easier for law enforcement to catch criminals.
Our analysis, however, demonstrates that this advantage will often
be illusory. LEOs will often not have an easier time catching
criminals because increased surveillance may simply result in
increased criminal innovation. In the cat-and-mouse game between
law enforcement and criminals, the reasonable expectation of
privacy test will erode the rules of the game without making it
easier for the cat to catch the mice; meanwhile, innocent bystanders
will receive less Fourth Amendment protection.
Therefore, the dichotomy in the Fourth Amendment literature
between police efficiency concerns and criminal rights protections
is often a false one. We show that by removing the warrant require-
ment, law enforcement can sometimes be easier, but often will not
be. In circumstances when there is significant uncertainty—by
criminals as to whether LEOs will investigate, and by LEOs as to
whether criminals will innovate—the assumption of greater
efficiency for warrantless searches is incorrect. In such cases,
removing the warrant requirement will not make police investiga-
tions more effective.
We show that uncertainty is likely to arise frequently. The
nonapplication of the warrant requirement will often cause little
gain for law enforcement and a significant incursion on the rights
of noncriminals. We consider a variety of mechanisms of privacy
protection available for digital communications, such as e-mail and
more fleeting electronic chatting. We show that some existing digital
mechanisms are too costly for the average noncriminal user, but are
perfectly calibrated to aid avoidance of detection of criminal
behavior and will enable highly effective criminal innovation.
Nonapplication of the warrant requirement will only encourage
criminal use of such technology, making law enforcement no better
off because unraveling powerful e-mail encryption, for example, will
be far more difficult than obtaining a warrant. Programs most
suited to noncriminal behavior will be left unprotected.
We establish these effects by using a game-theoretic model of
criminal innovation and law enforcement countermeasures. An
extensive economic literature exists that analyzes the most efficient
and effective mechanisms of deterring crime by varying the extent
770 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:759
of punishment, among other factors.41 But discouraging criminal
behavior by changing incentives will change the opportunity cost to
law enforcement in choosing any given investigative priority.42 This
in turn will change criminals’ expectations of being caught, and thus
their incentive to innovate.43 The interactions between criminals
and LEOs must be considered dynamically, in terms of their feed-
back effects on one another. Unlike previous analyses, we account
for this dynamic interaction by employing a game-theoretic model
that allows us to simultaneously map the effect of criminal avoid-
ance on the law-enforcement decision to investigate, and vice versa.
This Article describes the “Police Efficiency Assumption”—that
law-enforcement investigations are impeded when an investigation
is considered a search and a warrant is required—and shows when
the Assumption fails. Part I begins by reviewing the law regarding
Fourth Amendment searches and showing the distorting effect of
the Police Efficiency Assumption. Part II reviews the existing
literature on criminal innovation and discusses ways in which inno-
vation can defeat the Assumption. Part III presents a model that
demonstrates the conditions necessary for the Assumption to fail.
Part IV discusses the policy implications of these results and shows
how they apply to mechanisms of ensuring privacy in the digital
age, including e-mail encryption and utilization of programs
specifically made for destroying communication trails, such as
Privnote44 and Snapchat.45 It concludes with a discussion of the
recent NSA mass data collection and analysis, and shows that the
nonapplication of the warrant requirement undermines Fourth
Amendment rights more than that recent controversial governmen-
tal spying program.
41. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, A Model of Optimal Fines for
Repeat Offenders, 46 J. PUB. ECON. 291, 292 (1991) (showing that maximal deterrence may
require variation in punishment levels by recidivism); Steven Shavell, A Model of Optimal
Incapacitation, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 107, 107 (1987) (factoring in the value of incapacitating
likely reoffenders).
42. See infra Part III.B.
43. See infra Part III.B.
44. See About Privnote, PRIVNOTE, https://privnote.com/about/ [http://perma.cc/GZU6-
HS6T] (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
45. See Jenna Wortham, A Growing App. Lets You See It, Then You Don’t, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 9, 2013, at A1.
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I. THE ROLE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN LAW-ENFORCEMENT
INVESTIGATIONS
The Fourth Amendment sets broad limits on federal and state
law-enforcement conduct during the investigation of crime46 by
prohibiting “unreasonable searches and seizures”47 and providing
that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.”48 This
seemingly straightforward language leaves many questions unan-
swered, including the definition of a “search”49 and the relationship
between the Reasonableness Clause and the Warrant Clause.50 Case
law has sought to clarify these important issues, but in this Part we
show that the ubiquitous Police Efficiency Assumption has led to a
distortion of key doctrines in this area.
A. The Warrant Requirement and the Manipulation of Definitions
of a Search
From the text of the Fourth Amendment, it is unclear whether
LEOs are required to obtain a valid warrant in order to conduct a
search.51 Read literally, the clause specifies only a limit on when
warrants can issue—with probable cause—and presents a separate
prohibition on unreasonable searches.52 Many commentators have
argued that the two clauses of the amendment are unconnected, and
that warrantless searches are constitutionally valid as long as they
are “reasonable”; the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment is
relevant under this view only when LEOs wish to obtain a warrant
prior to a search.53 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has long 
46. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949).
47. For simplicity of language, we refer to searches and seizures collectively as “searches”
in this Article because the distinction is irrelevant to our analysis. 
48. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
49. See, e.g., Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth
Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 122 (2002). 
50. See, e.g., Jeffrey Bellin, Crime-Severity Distinctions and the Fourth Amendment:
Reassessing Reasonableness in a Changing World, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1, 8 (2011); Joseph D.
Grano, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 603,
603 (1982).
51. See, e.g., Bellin, supra note 50; Grano, supra note 50.
52. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
53. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV.
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considered warrantless searches to be presumptively unreason-
able,54 and has also ordained that ordinarily, reasonableness is only
satisfied through obtaining a warrant.55 Thus, LEOs are routinely
required to obtain warrants prior to undertaking any search, unless
the search falls into one of the well-delineated exceptions to the
warrant requirement.56
A requirement that LEOs obtain a warrant for all searches raises
the question of what constitutes a search under the Fourth Amend-
ment. Many actions that LEOs undertake during the course of in-
vestigating a crime, such as interviewing victims or reading the
criminal records of suspects, are clearly not searches. However, as
we explain below, there are many types of law-enforcement activity
that courts do not consider to be searches in the constitutional sense
of triggering the protections of the Fourth Amendment, but lay-
people would widely consider to be a type of search.57 For instance,
757, 761 (1994) (“The words of the Fourth Amendment really do mean what they say. They
do not require warrants, even presumptively, for searches and seizures.”).
54. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (“ ‘Over and again this Court
has emphasized’ ... that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”
(quoting United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951))). The Court is arguably moving away
from the warrant requirement in recent decisions. See, e.g., Peter Swire, A Reasonableness
Approach to Searches After the Jones GPS Tracking Case, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 57, 59-
60 (2012), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/online/topics/64-SLRO-57.pdf
[http://perma.cc/L954-B8LK]; see also Tom Goldstein, Why Jones Is Still Less of a Pro-Privacy
Decision Than Most Thought (Conclusion Slightly Revised Jan. 31), SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 30,
2012, 10:53 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/01/why-jones-is-still-less-of-a-pro-privacy-
decision-than-most-thought/ [http://perma.cc/4HZT-DDUW].
55. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (“[R]easonableness
generally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant.” (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’
Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989))).
56. See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 573 (1991) (search of containers within
automobiles); Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990) (protective sweep); Skinner v. Ry.
Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 620 (1989) (special needs doctrine); United States v.
Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 416 (1976) (felony arrest exception); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (consent); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971)
(discussing the plain view doctrine); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48 (1970) (general
automobile exception); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 756 (1969) (search incident to
lawful arrest); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (Terry stops); Camara v. Mun. Court of
S.F., 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (administrative searches); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
770-71 (1966) (exigent circumstances).
57. See Susan F. Mandiberg, Reasonable Officers vs. Reasonable Lay Persons in the
Supreme Court’s Miranda and Fourth Amendment Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1481,
1516-18 (2010).
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listening to a conversation via a wire worn by a confidential
informant may be solid police work, but laypeople could easily
consider this to be a search58—contrary to Supreme Court doctrine.59
Similarly, having a professionally trained police narcotics detection
dog sniff an airline passenger’s luggage60 or a person’s car trunk61 in
order to detect contraband hidden within may be reasonable, but is
nonetheless arguably a search,62 just as it would be if that dog was
sniffing near the entrance of a house.63 Yet the Court has deemed
that LEO-guided canine examinations are not searches in the first
two situations,64 whereas dog sniffs near the home are considered to
be searches.65
These distinctions are illustrations of a general doctrinal problem:
many activities that would ordinarily be considered searches are not
deemed searches by courts for Fourth Amendment purposes.66
Courts fail to classify investigations as searches in order to avoid
the consequent assumption of unreasonableness of the activity in
the absence of probable cause and a warrant, as well as the poten-
tial application of the exclusionary rule.67 Courts typically assume
the warrant requirement impedes police efficiency,68 and often fudge
whether an investigation constitutes a search in order to avoid
requiring a warrant.69
58. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(“More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has
no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”).
59. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752-53 (1971).
60. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
61. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005).
62. See Jacobi, supra note 39, at 662 (criticizing the Court’s analysis in United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696).
63. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414, 1417-18 (2013) (involving an intrusion upon
the homeowner’s property). 
64. See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409; Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
65. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417.
66. See, e.g., Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409; Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
67. See Jacobi, supra note 39, at 586. 
68. Police efficiency in this context refers to the general notion of economic efficiency: the
ability of law enforcement to use its scarce resources (time, money, and skill) to produce a
service (the capture and eventual conviction of criminals). 
69. As Judge Guido Calabresi put it: 
Judges—politicians’ claims to the contrary notwithstanding—are not in the
business of letting people out on technicalities. If anything, judges are in the
business of keeping people who are guilty in on technicalities.... [T]he judge
facing a clearly guilty murderer or rapist [claiming a Fourth Amendment
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In order to delineate between legal searches and common-sense
searches, we use the term “investigations” to refer to any type of
action LEOs take in order to obtain evidence. Investigations
includes those deemed “searches” under the Fourth Amendment, as
well as “nonsearches”—any law-enforcement activity that courts do
not consider to be a search under the Fourth Amendment, even if
laypeople may be consider it to be a type of search. Searches require
a warrant in the absence of an exception to the warrant require-
ment, whereas LEOs are not required to obtain a warrant for a
nonsearch.
The Supreme Court’s primary test for distinguishing between
searches and nonsearches appears in Katz v. United States.70 The
most influential expression of the test comes from Justice Harlan’s
concurrence:71 a law-enforcement investigation is a search if it
violates an individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy,”72
meaning first that the individual has “exhibited an actual (subjec-
tive) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one
that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’ ”73 In Katz, the
Court found that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his telephone conversation that took place within a closed
public phone booth, even though such a location would not ordi-
narily be considered a private place.74 Recently in United States v.
Jones, the Supreme Court added to the Katz framework by specify-
ing that any physical trespass of a constitutionally protected area
may constitute a search.75
violation] will do her best to protect the fundamental right and still keep the
defendant in jail.
Guido Calabresi, The Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 111, 112 (2003).
70. 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967). 
71. For a discussion about Justice Harlan’s concurrence, see, for example, Minnesota v.
Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring); Cecil J. Hunt, II, Calling in the Dogs:
Suspicionless Sniff Searches and Reasonable Expectations of Privacy, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
285, 313 (2005); and David A. Sullivan, A Bright Line in the Sky? Toward a New Fourth
Amendment Search Standard for Advanced Surveillance Technology, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 967, 975
(2002).
72. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 361.
74. Id. at 351-52 (majority opinion) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places.”).
75. 132 S. Ct. 945, 949, 950 & n.3 (2012). Justie Scalia, writing for the Court, claimed to
be applying well-settled law that a trespass is sufficient to constitute a search. Id. at 950. But
numerous previous decisions explicitly rejected the trespass doctrine. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United
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Both Katz and Jones expanded the definition of search. Katz
expanded a search beyond the physical penetration of constitution-
ally protected areas,76 and Jones redefined a physical penetration as
sufficient,77 albeit not necessary after Katz, to constitute a search.
Nevertheless, most doctrine pertaining to searches has used the
definition of a search to exclude a wide variety of law-enforcement
investigations from the category of constitutionally recognized
searches. Though there are many types of nonsearches, three
doctrines are especially useful to illustrate the efforts courts go to
in order to avoid categorization of investigative practices as
searches, and thus to avoid the application of the warrant require-
ment and its assumed interference with police efficiency.
First, the Fourth Amendment does not protect information know-
ingly relinquished to someone else.78 This rule also encompasses
parties not participating directly in a conversation, such as a
telephone company that keeps records of numbers dialed.79 The
rationale for this doctrine is that it is unreasonable for someone to
have an expectation of privacy in information given to another
because the other person is free to divulge the information to any-
one.80 Courts have applied the doctrine to many circumstances. For
example, it is not a search when an undercover agent or confidential
informant speaks with a subject,81 even if the informant is wearing
a wire that allows LEOs to simultaneously hear the conversation.82
Following this logic, the third-party doctrine precludes any expecta-
tion of privacy in the telephone numbers an individual dials, even
from a home phone, despite the protections of the home.83 By simply
States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978). Moreover, the Court
has not yet clarified how this can be reconciled with the rule that trespasses onto property
that constitute “open fields” under Fourth Amendment law are not considered searches at all.
See infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, Jones does not change the
analysis in this Article in any meaningful way and does not disturb existing case law
regarding the search/nonsearch distinction.
76. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52.
77. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949, 950 & n.3.
78. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979); Matthew Tokson, Automa-
tion and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L. REV. 581, 584 (2011).
79. Smith, 442 U.S. at 744.
80. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971).
81. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 295, 302 (1966).
82. White, 401 U.S. at 751.
83. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44.
776 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:759
dialing a phone number, an individual has “voluntarily conveyed
numerical information to the telephone company and exposed that
information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business. In
so doing, [the individual] assumed the risk that the company would
reveal to the police the numbers he dialed.”84 
The implications of this doctrine are vast: any provision of infor-
mation, however detailed and personal, when given to third parties,
no matter how hidden the presence of those third parties, is exposed
to state investigation without the protection of the Fourth Amend-
ment. This includes a person’s banking information: because his
bank has access to the records, the state is free to access those
records without such access being considered a search.85 The third-
party doctrine is controversial,86 and Justice Sotomayor recently
proposed its reconsideration due to the breadth of its impact on
daily personal activities;87 however, the Justices recognized such
considerations at the time of the doctrine’s development,88 and con-
sidered the goal of efficient policing strong enough to overcome that
concern.89
A second category of nonsearch covers situations in which LEOs,
while observing actions occurring in plain sight in a public forum,
“augment[ ] the sensory faculties bestowed upon them by birth with
such enhancement as science and technology afford[ ] them.”90 This
allows the police to fly airplanes91 or helicopters92 over the property
of those suspected of growing marijuana without such conduct being
categorized as a search, even if they are using high-powered cam-
84. Id. at 744 (internal quotation marks omitted).
85. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
86. See, e.g., Gerald G. Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the “Legitimate Expectation
of Privacy,” 34 VAND. L. REV. 1289, 1315 (1981); Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as
a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1254-56 (1983); Tokson, supra
note 78, at 585.
87. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955-57 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(arguing that GPS data reveals intensely private information, such as trips to the
psychiatrist, the abortion clinic, or the AIDS treatment center, and that being watched chills
associational and expressive freedoms).
88. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 761-64 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
89. We return to consideration of the third-party doctrine in Part IV.B when discussing
electronic mechanisms that attempt to ensure digital privacy.
90. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983). 
91. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986).
92. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1989).
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eras.93 The only significant limit on the capacity of law enforcement
to use enhanced technology applies when the technology enables
LEOs to gain information about events occurring inside the home.
This limitation still permits LEOs to place radio transmitters in
goods given to a suspect as long as the transmitter allows law
enforcement only to track the suspect’s public movements94 and not
the suspect’s movements within her home.95 Conversely, the use of
thermal-imaging devices to detect patterns of heat emanating from
a home is a search that requires a warrant because it provides law
enforcement with information about activity inside that they would
not be able to sense without the device.96 Though there may be good
reason to distinguish between the level of protection that a home
versus a public space should receive, it seems counterintuitive to
consider the use of the same technology to look for the same infor-
mation in the same way a search in one case and a nonsearch in the
other, simply due to the change in location. The reason for such a
doctrinal contrivance may be that courts assume the police effi-
ciency of avoiding the warrant requirement—achieved by labeling
such investigations outside the home nonsearches—is high enough
to overcome the privacy lost through allowing law enforcement
investigative freedom in public places, but not high enough to
overcome the privacy costs of similarly liberalizing investigations of
the home.
Additional judicial artifices have nonetheless mitigated the
protection of the home as the Court has adopted a restrictive
definition of what parts of private property constitute the home.
This brings us to the third category of nonsearches: an investigation
that takes place in an “open field” surrounding the home is not a
search.97 To be classified as an open field, and thus for law-enforce-
ment investigations to be categorized as nonsearches, the property
in question need not be open or a field. An open field can include
any unoccupied or undeveloped area outside of the “curtilage” of a
93. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986).
94. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282. 
95. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 719 (1984).
96. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). The Court required a warrant for the
additional reason that the device was not in such public use as to make a reasonable person
expect that a private citizen would point one at a home. Id.
97. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984).
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home,98 which is the land that immediately surrounds the house and
is associated with it.99 The Court’s definition of unoccupied land is
at times quite broad. For instance, in Oliver v. United States, police
entered a private property on which there was a parked camper, a
barn, and a locked gate.100 The Court held that there was no reason-
able expectation of privacy even though the homeowner had posted
“no trespassing” signs.101 In United States v. Dunn, even two sets of
fencing, which isolated two barns from the outside world, did not
preclude federal officers’ warrantless entry into the barns from
constituting a nonsearch.102 So, LEOs may search private property
containing a home and other associated structures—and those
structures themselves—under the rubric of nonsearches, thus
avoiding the jurisdiction of the Fourth Amendment altogether.
These three categories of nonsearches are by no means exhaus-
tive, but they are enough to illustrate the restrictive approach of the
Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment search jurisprudence. Law-
enforcement investigations that would be considered searches under
any straightforward interpretation of the text of the Fourth Amend-
ment are routinely categorized as nonsearches. The problems with
this outcome are twofold: It promotes a jurisprudence that lacks
plausibility and coherence, and it leaves many innocent citizens
without recourse against unreasonable law-enforcement intrusions
on their property and persons—for if an investigation is deemed to
be a nonsearch, the court never needs to determine whether the law-
enforcement action was unreasonable. The next Section shows that
the reason for such harmful doctrinal manipulation is the courts’
assumption that warrants impede law-enforcement investigations.
B. The Distorting Effect of the Assumption that Warrants Impede
Investigations
In the Fourth Amendment context, courts often recognize the
facilitation of law-enforcement investigations as a central value in
the debate over what the law should be and, to the extent that
98. Id. at 180 n.11.
99. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1987).
100. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 173.
101. Id. at 179.
102. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 297, 301-03.
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courts decide Fourth Amendment questions through a balancing
analysis, what the law is. Investigating crime in an effective manner
is essential to disincentivizing crime and maintaining law and
order, and so protecting the right to be free from violence. For this
reason, although the Fourth Amendment makes explicit the value
of protecting privacy rights against police intrusions, courts regular-
ly enunciate the additional, and arguably countervailing, value of
respecting and enabling the ability of law enforcement to investigate
and prosecute crime. For most Fourth Amendment questions, the
analysis ultimately boils down to a balancing of whether prohibiting
a particular investigative technique without a warrant does more to
protect the privacy interests of citizens or to harm the ability of
LEOs to effectively investigate crime. This type of balancing inquiry
appears in the Supreme Court’s analysis of the warrant require-
ment,103 the search/nonsearch distinction,104 and various exceptions
to the warrant requirement.105
When deciding these types of Fourth Amendment questions,
courts and commentators often assume that requiring LEOs to
obtain warrants will impede the investigation and ultimate prosecu-
tion of crimes. Requiring LEOs to obtain a warrant for a particular
investigation will make it more difficult to find evidence because
warrants cost LEOs both time and effort106 and because LEOs must
103. See, e.g., Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 438-39 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the warrant requirement should be reconsidered given its negative impact on
law enforcement); Bernard E. Harcourt & Tracey L. Meares, Randomization and the Fourth
Amendment, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 815 (2011); Swire, supra note 54, at 59-62. The Court has,
however, at times denied using such a balancing inquiry regarding the warrant requirement.
E.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 433, 481 (1971) (“The warrant requirement ... is
not an inconvenience to be somehow ‘weighed’ against the claims of police efficiency.”).
104. For instance, in cases in which LEOs augment their senses with technology without
a warrant, the Court has considered the enhancement of law-enforcement detection such
technology offers, weighed against the added intrusion into privacy. See, e.g., California v.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983). 
105. See, e.g., Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 220-22 (1981); Mincey v. Arizona,
437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978). 
106. Technology is making it easier for LEOs to attain a warrant quickly. See Cecilia Chan,
Search-Warrant Process for DUIs Faster for Phoenix Police, AZCENTRAL (Apr. 11, 2013, 8:37
PM), http://www.archive.azcentral.com/community/phoenix/articles/20130410phoenix-police-
search-warrant-process-duis-faster-brk.html [http://perma.cc/K2B-7CBY] (reporting that
police in Phoenix can use the eSearch Warrant Application to send a warrant from the patrol
car directly to a judge, who can approve or reject it from a laptop). There is, however, always
some nonzero cost for procuring a warrant, as the Court has recently noted: “Even with
modern technological advances, the warrant procedure imposes burdens on the officers who
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establish probable cause ex ante.107 Laying out the basis of officers’
suspicion before a neutral magistrate can delay an investigation,
and the magistrate’s potential failure to find probable cause can
prevent the search from taking place altogether. Allowing LEOs to
proceed without a warrant, in contrast, could lead both to the
discovery of evidence that would have been destroyed during the
wait for a warrant and the seizure of evidence that would never
have been found if there was no probable cause for a legal search.108
The assumption that the warrant requirement impedes police
efficiency is mentioned frequently both by commentators critiquing
the general warrant requirement and those advocating possible ex-
ceptions to the requirement: they argue that warrants impede police
investigations and that this cost outweighs privacy concerns.109 In
juxtaposition, advocates of expansive Fourth Amendment rights
argue that the concern about impeding law enforcement investiga-
tions is overstated, either because probable cause is a low bar for
the procurement of a warrant,110 or because the time and effort costs
of obtaining a warrant have not been shown to be prohibitively
high.111 Even those commentators skeptical of the police efficiency
justification, however, assume that the warrant requirement im-
pedes a law-enforcement investigation to some extent; they simply
dispute by how much.112 Both sides of the debate assume a trade-off
between police efficiency and rights. They merely disagree about the
wish to search [and] the magistrate who must review the warrant application.” Fernandez v.
California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1137 (2014); see also infra Part III.D.
107. See, e.g., James J. Tomkovicz, California v. Acevedo: The Walls Close in on the
Warrant Requirement, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1103, 1153-54 (1992).
108. See, e.g., id. at 1154.
109. See, e.g., John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027,
1027 (1974) (discussing this argument); Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored
Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208,
1228 n.142 (2004) (arguing that search warrants should not be required to obtain
“noncontent” information provided to an internet service provider).
110. See Tokson, supra note 78, at 641 (“[T]here is evidence to suggest that this concern is
overstated.... [P]olice may often be able to gather sufficient evidence for probable cause before
obtaining [the evidence sought in a warrant].”).
111. See Tomkovicz, supra note 107, at 1157.
112. See Tokson, supra note 78, at 640-41 (“[R]equiring a warrant to obtain [evidence]
would unduly burden the police ... [because] [i]t could prevent them from gathering the initial
evidence required to show probable cause, and thus preclude effective investigations
altogether.”); Tomkovicz, supra note 107, at 1157 (“[T]he deliberate warranted search process
undoubtedly results in some lost prosecutions.”).
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normative value of each opposing possible outcome: warrantless
searches and nonsearches versus imposing the warrant requirement
and delaying or even preventing some searches.
The Court has been inconsistent in its willingness to explicitly
acknowledge that it has balanced an interest in facilitating law-
enforcement investigation against the privacy concerns underlying
the warrant requirement. The Court has most often held that the
general interest in police efficiency alone cannot justify holding that
LEOs are not required to obtain a warrant,113 and has at times used
the interest as part of a balancing test.114 At other times the Court
has explicitly stated that “the mere fact that law enforcement may
be made more efficient can never itself justify disregard of the
Fourth Amendment.”115 The latter statement, however, has largely
become a catchphrase of dissenting justices in opposing majorities’
implicit acceptance of the trade-off between rights and police effi-
ciency.116 Even this opposing position implies only that the value of
police efficiency is not enough by itself to overcome a constitutionally
recognized right to privacy, not that police efficiency is irrelevant.
Regardless of whether police efficiency is important enough to over-
come privacy concerns, the Justices have commonly assumed that
law-enforcement investigations are in fact impeded to some extent
when warrants are required: “The investigation of crime would
always be simplified if warrants were unnecessary.”117
One area in which the Court has displayed its acceptance of the
value of the Police Efficiency Assumption and its impairment by the
warrant requirement is in crafting exceptions to the warrant require-
113. See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 115 n.5 (2006); Steagald v. United States, 451
U.S. 204, 222 (1981); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978). 
114. See Steagald, 451 U.S. at 222 (balancing the impediment to law-enforcement
investigations against the intrusion into privacy of unwarranted searches). 
115. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393.
116. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 469 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority for justifying comprehensive searches of the person of an arrestee
without a warrant in order to guide the officer in the field).
117. E.g., Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393; see also Steagald, 451 U.S. at 222 (“Any warrant
requirement impedes to some extent the vigor with which the Government can seek to enforce
its laws.”). Some Justices have argued that this impediment is small. See Arkansas v.
Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 767 (1979) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“[The] warrant requirement is
not so onerous.”); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 171 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the degree to which Fourth Amendment impedes effective law
enforcement is grossly exaggerated). 
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ment. For instance, the Court in New York v. Belton determined
that the passenger compartment of a car is included in the “the one
lunge area”118—the area within the immediate control of the ar-
restee in a search incident to arrest.119 The Court concluded that
searching the passenger compartment was an automatic entitle-
ment, regardless of where the arrestee was when the search took
place, or whether he was truly able to reach the passenger compart-
ment.120 The Court was willing to make a broad generalization that
articles inside the passenger compartment “are in fact generally,
even if not inevitably, within ‘the area into which an arrestee might
reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary item.’ ”121 The Court
justified this factual presumption largely on the basis that “a
policeman [cannot otherwise] know the scope of his authority.”122
The Court was concerned about the practical difficulties that would
arise for LEOs without such a bright line, and looked for a rule that
would provide them certainty, and thus efficiency, in investigating
crime and making arrests.123 The Court created this warrant
exception expansion out of the concern for effective law-enforcement
practice but subsequently rejected that position in Arizona v.
Gant.124 However, in Gant, the Court reversed itself on the basis
that the factual claim in Belton was no longer true, not because the
Court rejected the Police Efficiency Assumption. The Court
concluded that the Belton decision itself had undermined its own
factual claim in that the incentives created by the rule had changed
law-enforcement practices.125
The assumption that the warrant requirement impedes law-
enforcement investigations also plays a role in cases defining the
distinction between a search and a nonsearch, as described above.
The Court has often presented this trade-off in terms of the value to
LEOs of using bright-line rules.126 For instance, in defining what
118. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460.
119. Id.; Leslie A. Lunney, The (Inevitably Arbitrary) Placement of Bright Lines: Belton and
Its Progeny, 79 TUL. L. REV. 365, 396 (2004).
120. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460. 
121. Id. (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 459-60.
124. 556 U.S. 332, 341-44 (2009).
125. Id. at 342-43. This interactive dynamic is returned to in Part III.C.
126. For an example of bright-line rules in search/nonsearch cases, see Kyllo v. United
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constituted an open field, a majority of the Court explicitly rejected
a case-by-case test proposed by the dissent,127 in part because the
lack of an ex ante rule would be unworkable for LEOs.128 Conse-
quently, even the existence of “no trespassing” signs and the
inability to see the field from the air did not prevent land from being
an open field—a rule that prevented even unreasonable law-
enforcement investigations from triggering Fourth Amendment
protection.129
For the same reason, the Court has considered police efficiency
when deciding whether the automobile warrant exception extends
to the investigation of containers within a car. Initially, the Court
distinguished between containers in a car (for which a warrant was
required) versus other objects in a car (which could be searched
without a warrant);130 in California v. Acevedo, however, the Court
recognized that this rule “provided only minimal protection for
privacy and ... impeded effective law enforcement.”131 The Court
attempted to manage what it had assumed to be an implicit trade-
off between police efficiency and privacy protection, although it was
realizing that in practice it did not work that way.132 The Court was
concerned that the rule “confused courts and police officers and
impeded effective law enforcement.”133 It also “noted the virtue of
providing clear and unequivocal guidelines to the law enforcement
profession.”134 Ultimately, the Court “conclude[d] that it was better
to adopt one clear-cut rule to govern automobile searches” and to
States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). 
127. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 189 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[W]e have
traditionally looked to a variety of factors in determining whether an expectation of privacy
asserted in a physical space is ‘reasonable.’”).
128. Id. at 181 (majority opinion) (“Nor would a case-by-case approach provide a workable
accommodation between the needs of law enforcement and the interests protected by the
Fourth Amendment.”).
129. The Court has similarly applied this analysis to other state actors, including prison
officials. For example, the Court has deemed the search of prison cells and seizure of
noncontraband not to require a warrant due to the constant surveillance needed for the
“institutional security and internal order” of prisons. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 527-28
(1984).
130. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977)
131. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 574 (1991).
132. This interactive dynamic is returned to in Part IV.A.
133. Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 576.
134. Id. at 579 (quoting Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 151 (1990)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
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expand the automobile warrant exception to include containers in
a car.135
Finally, the Court has acknowledged the influence of police
efficiency in its analyses of the probable cause test—the threshold
that LEOs must satisfy in order to gain a warrant. Illinois v. Gates
laid out the modern totality-of-the-circumstances test for establish-
ing probable cause.136 In Gates, the Court justified its willingness to
relax the two prongs that had been rigidly applied to probable
cause137 out of recognition of the practical difficulties that LEOs face
in the field: “[A]ffidavits [for search warrants] are normally drafted
by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation.
Technical requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under
common law pleadings have no proper place in this area.”138 In this
way, the Court made probable cause easier for LEOs to establish out
of recognition of the need for police efficiency under trying circum-
stances.
These and other examples show that the judicial desire to
promote police efficiency has driven much of the doctrinal develop-
ment in Fourth Amendment law. The Police Efficiency Assumption
makes a great deal of intuitive sense—undoubtedly, a warrant
requirement will in many cases make it more difficult for LEOs to
find admissible evidence, both because of the direct costs of
obtaining a warrant, and because of the screening function of the
probable cause requirement. However, this Article shows that, in
many circumstances, requiring LEOs to obtain a warrant before
they can undertake an investigation will not make it harder to
obtain evidence. The key to this insight is that criminals can
innovate in order to prevent LEOs from finding evidence in an
investigation.139 As we show below, allowing LEOs to investigate
without warrants will often provide criminals with a greater
incentive to innovate.140 This innovation will decrease the likelihood
that law enforcement will find evidence during an investigation,
135. Id.
136. 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
137. The Court created this rigid two-prong test in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410,
415-16 (1969).
138. Gates, 462 U.S. at 235 (quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
139. See infra Part II. 
140. See infra Part III.
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and, under certain conditions, will offset the benefit that law en-
forcement gains from not having to obtain a warrant. In these cases,
the Police Efficiency Assumption will be incorrect.
II. CRIMINAL INNOVATION
It has long been accepted that criminals respond to incentives.141
Modern empirical research has shown that increased expected
punishments deter crime.142 Yet punishment can cause criminals to
change their behavior in ways other than deciding whether to
commit a crime, including by innovating. Criminal innovation
occurs when a criminal changes his behavior in a strategy designed
to decrease the likelihood that law enforcement obtains admissible
evidence of a completed or planned crime. Although this phenome-
non has been addressed in the economic literature,143 it has been
largely overlooked in legal scholarship, including its implications for
the warrant requirement. Additionally, the economic analysis of
criminal innovation has been static, and has not considered the
dynamic nature of police-criminal interactions. In this Part, we
survey the existing work regarding criminal innovation and discuss
the impact that criminal innovation may have on the Police
Efficiency Assumption.
A. Existing Scholarship on Criminal Innovation
Under the conventional economic model of crime—the Becker
model—criminals are deterred from committing crime when the
benefit of crime is outweighed by the expected punishment, defined
as the probability of being convicted multiplied by the punishment
that comes with conviction.144 Both public policy and the law place
a high value on protecting and enhancing the ability of LEOs to
141. JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAW, reprinted in 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM 365, 399 (Edinburgh, Simpkin, Marshall & Co., 1843) (1789) (“The profit of the
crime is the force which urges a man to delinquency: the pain of the punishment is the force
employed to restrain him from it.”).
142. For a survey of this research, see Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at
the Outset of the Twenty-First Century, 23 CRIME & JUST. 1, 8-12 (1998).
143. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169 (1968).
144. Id. at 185.
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investigate crime and obtain prosecutions, and various reforms to
sentencing practices were considered to maximize crime prevention
and crime resolution.
In contrast, the implications of criminal innovation on models of
criminal behavior were long overlooked, despite the fact that crim-
inals can take many measures to avoid punishment.145 Avoidance
behaviors can occur before a crime has been committed, after the
crime but before arrest, or after indictment.146 Collectively, these
behaviors are known in the literature as “detection avoidance.”147
Simple examples of anticipatory detection avoidance that occur
during commission of a crime include wearing gloves or installing
a radar detector in one’s car; more complex mechanisms, such as e-
mail encryption, are explored later.148 Detection avoidance may also
occur after indictment through providing false testimony in court or
escaping from custody.149 Because this Article concerns law-enforce-
ment investigations and the warrant process, we focus on only those
detection avoidance innovations that occur prior to arrest.150
By innovating, criminals can decrease the likelihood that evi-
dence of a crime will be detected, yet the Becker model of crime does
not take this into account.151 More recently, scholars have begun to
145. See Chris William Sanchirico, Detection Avoidance and Enforcement Theory: Survey
and Assessment 1 (U. of Pa. Inst. for Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, No. 10-29, 2010),
available at http://perma.cc/B9EZ-JU6H (“The subject of evidentiary foul play—inclusive of
fabricated testimony, document destruction, and myriad other modes of detection
avoidance—is underrepresented in both legal and law and economic scholarship on procedure
and evidence.”).
146. See Nussim & Tabbach, supra note 14.
147. See Sanchirico, supra note 145.
148. See infra Part IV.B.
149. Most of the detection avoidance strategies that occur after indictment are themselves
punishable as crimes. See id. For a discussion of the possibility of criminalizing criminal
innovation behaviors, as well as problems with this idea, see infra notes 156-60 and
accompanying text.
150. Police investigations, such as searches of a suspect’s home, can of course occur after
the suspect’s arrest. But the behavior necessary to hide evidence generally takes place prior
to the arrest. 
151. Sanchirico, supra note 145, at 3. (“The probability that wrongs and offenses are detec-
ted is a central feature of the conventional model of enforcement. But the conventional model
is starkly asymmetric regarding the determinants of this probability. It takes into account the
government’s efforts at detecting violations, but it ignores violators’ efforts at avoiding
detection.”); see also Chris William Sanchirico, Detection Avoidance, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1331,
1333 (2006) (“Our theories of evidence and procedure focus too much on wrongdoing as the
subject of evidence, and not enough on evidence as the subject of wrongdoing.”). 
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study the impact that criminal detection avoidance can have on the
conventional model of crime.
The first model to incorporate criminal detection avoidance was
published by Arun Malik in 1990.152 Aside from introducing avoid-
ance into models of criminal behavior, the model demonstrated that
a crucial result of Becker’s model of crime—that crime should be
punished by fines that are set as high as possible153—does not hold
if criminals are able to engage in avoidance because the prospect of
a large fine provides an incentive to engage in avoidance.154
Nussim and Tabbach extended this model by showing that
increasing the direct costs of crime, or the likelihood of punishment,
may actually increase the amount of criminal activity if avoidance
is possible.155 A subsequent article by the same authors looked at
the possibility of punishing avoidance behaviors as a way to deter
them.156 Their model showed that, whereas ex ante regulation of
avoidance activities—such as taxes on radar detectors—decreases
both crime and avoidance, ex post punishment of avoidance—such
as increased fines for being caught speeding while using a radar
detector—may be counterproductive, inducing more avoidance and
more crime.157 The difficulty with this conclusion, as a number of
authors have argued, is that it may be impossible to effectively sanc-
tion avoidance because it is difficult to detect.158 This is even more
difficult for ex ante regulation, because many items used for
avoidance, such as ski masks or prepaid cell phones, have legitimate
as well as criminal uses.159 Furthermore, sanctioning avoidance
simply creates an incentive for criminals to avoid detection of this
avoidance.160
This Article differs from earlier work on criminal avoidance in
two respects. First, it analyzes the interaction of criminal avoidance
152. Arun S. Malik, Avoidance, Screening and Optimum Enforcement, 21 RAND J. ECON.
341, 342 (1990). 
153. Becker, supra note 143, at 193.
154. Malik, supra note 152.
155. Jacob Nussim & Avraham D. Tabbach, Deterrence and Avoidance, 29 INT’L REV. L. &
ECON. 314, 321 (2009).
156. Nussim & Tabbach, supra note 14, at 45.
157. Id. at 62.
158. For a brief survey of authors taking this position, see Sanchirico, supra note 145, at 18.
159. Nussim & Tabbach, supra note 14, at 48-49.
160. See Sanchirico, supra note 151, at 1331, 1338-40. 
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with the warrant requirement, a topic that has not been previously
addressed. Second, it considers the effects that criminal avoidance
may have on LEOs’ decision whether to investigate. Because this
inquiry is two-sided, our analysis employs game theory rather than
a direct economic model of crime. Like the Becker model,161 this
game-theoretic approach uses law and economics to model human
behavior, building on the assumption that people act rational-
ly—that they make consistent decisions that maximize their
utility.162 But instead of examining only the utility of the criminal
facing possible punishment, we consider the interwoven incentives
of LEOs to investigate more or less vigorously. We analyze not only
the “best response”163 of the criminal to crime enforcement policies,
but also the best response of law enforcement to criminal innovation
in response to those policies, the best response of criminals to the
responses of law enforcement, and so on. This allows us to predict
outcomes in a dynamic interaction, representing the ongoing cat-
and-mouse game between criminals and law enforcement.
B. Criminal Innovation and the Police Efficiency Assumption
Criminals’ ability to innovate can defeat the Police Efficiency
Assumption in certain situations. Criminals have more incentive to
innovate when a warrant is not required than when a warrant is
required, which in turn occurs because it is easier for LEOs to
investigate without a warrant. Ultimately, LEOs may be no better
off in terms of their ability to catch criminals when warrants are
161. See generally Becker, supra note 143.
162. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3-6 (5th ed. 1998). This is
sometimes contrasted with behavioral economics, which is based on experimental findings
that people often make decisions that are economically irrational due to so-called “cognitive
biases.” See, e.g., Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and Economics:
Its Origins, Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1033, 1034 (2012).
Although behavioral economics analysis is very valuable, it is necessarily secondary: it is
essential to first determine what a rational response to a problem is before analyzing likely
deviations from that rational response. Because criminal innovation has never before been
conceived as part of a game between the police and criminals, it is important to create a basic
model of this interaction before introducing cognitive biases into our model to determine how
these may change the results. 
163. In game theory, a “best response” is the strategy or strategies that produces the most
favorable outcome for a player, taking the other players’ strategies as given. PETER C.
ORDESHOOK, GAME THEORY AND POLITICAL THEORY 115 (1986).
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required versus when they are not because the extent of criminal
innovation can overwhelm the reduced costs of not needing a
warrant.
The interaction between criminal incentives and LEO incentives
is dynamic. Criminals will have an increased incentive to innovate
when LEOs can incur lower effort costs in order to conduct an
investigation because, absent the cost of this innovation, LEOs could
otherwise investigate more often. This increased innovation will
lead to the failure of the Assumption when the gains to LEOs from
not having to obtain a warrant are offset by a reduction in the
likelihood of finding evidence during an investigation due to
criminal innovation. This is not like saying that better cars lead to
worse driving; rather, the dynamic is interactive, and key to that
interaction is the interdependence of the conduct of both criminals
and LEOs in a context of uncertainty. If the criminal knows that
LEOs will investigate regardless, the criminal’s innovation will not
differ based on the warrant requirement; the same is true if LEOs
are certain not to investigate.164 If LEOs decide to always investi-
gate when they do not need a warrant, but never investigate when
they do need a warrant, this may also lead the criminal to innovate.
Although this situation does not violate the Assumption, innovation
nevertheless reduces law-enforcement gains from not having to
obtain a warrant.165
In developing various exceptions to the warrant rule, the Su-
preme Court Justices have painfully learned the importance of
understanding the dynamic nature of police-criminal interactions.
For instance, as discussed above,166 the Court previously held that
different levels of protection applied to evidence located in contain-
ers in cars versus evidence located in the car itself, even when the
evidence was in a part of the car that itself forms a kind of con-
tainer, such as the glove box or the trunk.167 But this rule created
perverse incentives: the only innovation required of criminals to
skirt the automobile exception was to keep contraband in containers
within the car, which was practically costless, and so the rule
164. See infra Part III.
165. See infra Part III.
166. See supra Part I.B.
167. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 426 (1981); see also Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S.
753, 763-65 (1979). 
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became unworkable.168 Similarly, the automobile arrest exception
initially automatically included the whole of the passenger compart-
ment of the car within the assumed “one lunge” area of potential
danger posed by the arrestee.169 But it later became standard
practice to handcuff the arrestee and place him in the back of the
squad car, where he clearly posed no danger to the officer, thus
undermining the justification for the exception.170 The difficulty with
reversing the “one lunge” assumption was that doing so could in-
centivize LEOs to put themselves in danger by leaving the arrestee
unhandcuffed and near the car in order to gain the power to search
the car.171 Thus both criminal and police incentives can change
dramatically based on doctrinal developments. Finally, because the
Court has held that law-enforcement surveillance flights do not
breach any reasonable expectation of privacy—because they provide
information only about open fields and not the home172—criminals
have been incentivized to innovate by hydroponically growing
marijuana inside, so that overhead airplanes and helicopters cannot
view the plants.173 The changing jurisprudence in many of the
exceptions previously described illustrates the dynamic nature of
police-criminal interactions.
Often, that dynamic involves criminal innovations, which are not
limited to the secreting of contraband. The ability of LEOs to obtain
bank records without a warrant encourages criminals to keep their
funds in less official financial institutions, and money laundering is
168. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820 (1982) (“[T]he practical consequences of
the Carroll decision would largely be nullified if the permissible scope of a warrantless search
of an automobile did not include containers and packages found inside the vehicle.”).
169. See supra notes 118-24 and accompanying text.
170. See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 344 (2009).
171. See id. at 362 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“If the applicability of the ... rule turned on
whether an arresting officer chooses to secure an arrestee prior to conducting a search, rather
than searching first and securing the arrestee later, the rule would ‘create a perverse
incentive for an arresting officer to prolong the period during which the arrestee is kept in an
area where he could pose a danger to the officer.’ ” (quoting United States v. Abdul-Saboor,
85 F.3d 664, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1996))).
172. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
173. See Glenn Smith, Marijuana Bust Shines Light on Utilities, POST & COURIER (Jan. 29,
2012, 12:01 AM), http://www.postandcourier.com/article/20120129/PC1602/301299979 [http://
perma.cc/SFY4-6CNW]. Arguably, the result has been stronger strains of marijuana, but this
is subject to ongoing debate. See Potency of Marijuana, UNIV. OF WASH. ALCOHOL & DRUG
ABUSE INST., http://www.adai.uw.edu/marijuana/factsheets/potency.htm [http://perma.
cc/S66F-Y86A] (last updated June 2013).
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a reaction to authorities’ ability to monitor a suspect’s finances. In
the digital realm, criminals fearing police surveillance can invest in
stronger encryption techniques, such as the Tor program.174 Each of
these innovations potentially creates significant hurdles to the
ability of law enforcement to catch these criminals. The question is,
do those investigatory impediments offset the advantage to law
enforcement from the eliminated costs of obtaining a warrant? And
if so, when?
III. AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF CRIMINAL INNOVATION AND THE
WARRANT REQUIREMENT
This Part provides an economic model that demonstrates when
the Police Efficiency Assumption will fail, or when LEOs will not be
better be off in terms of their ability to catch criminals, if they are
not required to obtain a warrant for an investigation than they
would be if a warrant were required. To make this assessment, we
analyze law-enforcement decisions in two different scenarios: one,
under the “Warrant” condition, when a court has determined that
a particular investigation is a search; the other, under the “Nonwar-
rant” condition, when a court has determined that the investigation
is a nonsearch. For example, if a court finds that an investigative
practice that LEOs widely consider to be a search is in fact a non-
search, or vice versa, we can compare the effect of the rule change
on police efficacy: if LEOs do not gain from the change away from
the warrant requirement, the Assumption fails. In economic lan-
guage, the Assumption fails if officers’ expected utility175 under the
Warrant condition is greater than or equal to that in the Nonwar-
rant condition.
Economic models enable us to formalize the incentives of both
criminals and LEOs, and to examine the effect of different rules on
their predicted behavior. Specifically, we use a game-theoretic
model because we need to examine the decisions of both LEOs and
the criminal as they influence each other.176 The likelihood that
174. See infra Part IV.B.
175. Expected utility is calculated by multiplying an actor’s utility from each possible
outcome by the probability that it will occur, and then summing across all possible outcomes.
JAMES D. MORROW, GAME THEORY FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS 16 (1994).
176. See MARTIN J. OSBORNE, AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 7 (2004) (explaining that
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LEOs will conduct an investigation depends upon the amount of
innovation by criminals, because the latter impacts the chances that
an investigation will find evidence. Likewise, the incentives for
criminals to innovate will increase when LEOs are more likely to
conduct an investigation. The utility of each actor depends on both
its own decisions and those of the other actor.
Most analyses of criminal innovation have not taken this
approach and have simply looked at the criminal’s decision whether
to innovate.177 These papers have treated a criminal’s likelihood of
being caught as a function of the amount of criminal innovation and
the amount of resources society devotes to detecting crime. How-
ever, this view overlooks the fact that the decision by LEOs to
investigate a particular crime is not fixed, but rather depends on the
likelihood that an investigation will be successful—in other words,
that it will reveal admissible evidence. Increased criminal innova-
tion leads not only to a smaller chance of LEOs finding evidence if
they conduct an investigation, but also to a smaller likelihood that
LEOs will investigate at all, given the fact that they know criminals
may innovate.178 Thus, it is crucial to look at both of these effects
when analyzing a criminal’s decision whether to innovate.179
game theory is applicable when the variables that impact one decision maker include other
decision makers).
177. See supra Part II.A.
178. This is true if the police are aware of possible innovation and have full information
regarding the incentives that may lead criminals to innovate. As discussed below, we assume
that the police do have knowledge of these incentives, just as criminals have knowledge of the
incentives faced by the police. See infra Part III.B.
179. The police will be able to innovate as well by developing better investigatory
techniques, such as having informants wear wires. Just like criminals, the police will innovate
when the benefits of innovation—the increased likelihood of finding admissible evi-
dence—outweigh the cost. We exclude police innovation from the analysis for two reasons.
First, the police will likely be able to spread the costs of an innovation over many different
investigations, making the cost of police innovation more of a long-term assessment than a
decision dictated by the context of a single investigation. For the most part, the amount of
police innovation can be considered as an exogenous variable when police decide whether to
innovate. Second, the warrant requirement does not affect the police decision to innovate
because the need for, and effectiveness of, police innovation depends on criminal innovation
rather than the warrant requirement. An exception would arise if the police had an
innovation that was especially effective in response to a specific criminal’s particular
innovation; in that case, police innovation may be more likely when criminals innovate.
Likewise, the criminal’s innovation decision is not usually affected by police innovation; only
the incentive to commit the crime itself is changed.
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This Part begins by discussing the variables that influence the
decision by law enforcement whether to search and the decision by
the criminal whether to innovate. It then lays out the games and
solves them to determine the likelihood that LEOs will search and
that the criminal will innovate. We are then able to specify the
conditions under which the Police Efficiency Assumption fails.
A. Criminal Utility
Criminals act to maximize the utility gained from their crime.
The model used here to analyze criminal decision making is adapted
from the Becker model of crime.180 That model analyzes a person’s
decision regarding the amount of crime to commit, comparing the
benefits from crime to the expected cost of committing crime—the
probability of detection multiplied by the punishment that comes
with detection.181 Our model is similar to Becker’s model, but in-
cludes some important changes.
First, we assume that the criminal has committed or is going to
commit a single isolated crime. This means that the criminal’s only
decision is whether to innovate to cover up the crime. This assump-
tion is in accord with what could be termed a “career criminal” or a
“sophisticated criminal,” who will definitely engage in a certain
crime. The analysis thus applies only to crimes that will not be
deterred by a transition from the Warrant condition to the Nonwar-
rant condition. Otherwise, the innovation and response effect we are
trying to assess could be obscured by the possible benefits to society
that may result in a move to the Nonwarrant condition through a
reduction in the overall level of crime.182 By examining a single
crime that the criminal is determined to commit, we can set aside
the possibility of crime reduction, which has been studied else-
where.183
180. See generally Becker, supra note 143 (providing intuitive proofs of the Becker model
of crime).
181. See id. at 181.
182. There is evidence that strictly enforcing the warrant requirement may lead to an
increase in crime. See Raymond A. Atkins & Paul H. Rubin, Effects of Criminal Procedure on
Crime Rates: Mapping Out the Consequences of the Exclusionary Rule 16 (Indep. Inst.,
Working Paper No. 9, 1999), available at http://perma.cc/3PVU-LNFT.
183. See William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After The Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2144-45
(2002) (“The police help to restrain crime. Rules that restrain the police thus tend to remove
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Second, we assume that the criminal can engage in innovation
that reduces the likelihood that LEOs will find evidence of crime in
the event of an investigation.184 This is the insight of the literature
regarding criminal innovation. However, unlike that literature,
which considers the amount of innovation to be a continuous var-
iable that can be chosen by a criminal,185 this model will treat
innovation as discrete rather than continuous—the criminal either
decides to innovate or not to innovate. The benefit of this assump-
tion is that it more closely reflects the reality of the situation in
which a criminal must decide whether to make an innovation in
order to avoid detection for a particular crime. A bank robber cannot
buy half of a mask and would not buy two masks for himself; a
murderer does not need two silencers for his single gun, but also
cannot purchase a silencer unless he pays the full price for it. A
criminal in this situation is undoubtedly already using some non-
zero amount of innovation; this preexisting innovation is encapsu-
lated in the probability that LEOs will find evidence in an investiga-
tion. In Part IV, we consider what happens when innovation occurs
on a sliding scale—when the choice is still whether to innovate, but
there is a range of innovation options.
Third, unlike in the Becker model, the likelihood that LEOs will
investigate a crime is not fixed for any given crime,186 but instead
changes depending on whether the criminal innovates. The exact
manner in which innovation changes the law-enforcement decision
whether to investigate depends upon the incentives that LEOs face,
but it is clear that LEOs will be less likely to investigate if criminals
innovate because the likelihood of finding evidence is reduced. This
interaction between the law-enforcement decision to search and the
criminal’s decision to innovate is central to the analysis and neces-
sitates the use of game theory to analyze the situation.
restraints on crime.... Restrictions on police authority act as a tax; they make criminal
investigations more expensive than they otherwise might be.” (footnote omitted)).
184. See, e.g., Malik, supra note 152.
185. See id.
186. See Becker, supra note 143, at 181 (explaining the variables in the Becker model).
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The criminal will aim to maximize his expected utility,187 which
will change depending on whether he innovates and whether LEOs
investigate:
Figure 1: Criminal’s Payoffs
Law-Enforcement Action
Investigate Not Investigate
Criminal’s
Choice
Innovate -c -?L -c
Not
Innovate -?H 0
The first utility matrix shows the relative costs of innovating and
not innovating, for each possible law enforcement action. Because
the criminal does not know whether LEOs will in fact investigate,
he weighs the relative costs and benefits of innovating or not innov-
ating within each shaded column, which models when LEOs have
either investigated or not investigated, respectively. This calculation
is analyzed in Part III.C.
Criminal utility is a function of c, the cost of innovation, and ?,
the probability that LEOs will find a particular piece of evidence if
they investigate, with the probability being high (?H) if the criminal
does not innovate, and low (?L) if he does. The criminal’s punish-
ment if he is convicted has been normalized to equal 1; as such, c
can be interpreted as the cost of innovation as a percentage of the
amount of punishment the criminal faces.
Other variables that may influence a criminal’s level of innova-
tion, such as the probability that the criminal will be convicted if the
evidence is found and the amount of punishment a convicted crimin-
al will receive, are omitted because they do not affect the general
result. Unlike for LEOs, the criminal’s payoffs are the same in the
Warrant and Nonwarrant conditions,188 so only one matrix is shown.
187. We make the standard assumption that the criminal and law enforcement are risk-
neutral. See, e.g., Malik, supra note 152, at 341; Sanchirico, supra note 145, at 3 n.8.
188. The warrant requirement shapes the criminal’s utility in that it determines the
relative costs to the police of investigating and not investigating, which is accounted for in the
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B. Law-Enforcement Activity
Unlike in most models of criminal innovation, which consider the
likelihood of a law-enforcement investigation to be fixed,189 LEOs in
this model investigate only if it is in their best interests to do so. In
order to assess the best interests of the police, we need to conceptua-
lize law-enforcement utility. Unlike criminal utility, which is
obviously the profits of crime, in these models it is standard to treat
law-enforcement utility as constituted purely by an interest in
effectively catching criminals. Thus, we disregard any other ele-
ments of job satisfaction or external interests, such as possibility of
corruption. There is an opportunity cost for any law-enforcement
investigation in terms of other investigations not undertaken or
delayed; rationally, LEOs will prioritize investigations that are
likely to lead to positive results. Viewed in these terms, it follows
that LEOs will have an incentive to search less often if criminals
innovate, because the likelihood of finding evidence in a search will
be smaller.
Similar to the criminal, LEOs will try to maximize their expected
utility. Just as the criminal’s utility depends on the actions of law
enforcement, in turn law-enforcement utility will change depending
on whether the criminal innovates. But because LEOs do not know
whether the criminal has innovated, they weigh the relative costs
of investigating and not investigating in each possible scenario.
Thus in the second utility matrix, LEOs decide whether to investi-
gate by comparing the expected payoffs for a given criminal action
in each shaded row.
Further complicating the situation here are considerations of the
different payoffs to law enforcement first under the condition in
which a warrant is required for the investigation, and then when no
warrant is required:
criminal utility matrix.
189. See, e.g., Malik, supra note 152.
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Figure 2: Law-Enforcement Payoffs
A. Warrant Condition
Law-Enforcement Choice
Investigate Not Investigate
Criminal’s
Action
Innovate -z -w +g?L 0
Not
Innovate -z -w +g?H 0
B. Nonwarrant Condition
Law-Enforcement Choice
Investigate Not Investigate
Criminal’s
Action
Innovate -z+g?L 0
Not
Innovate -z+g?H 0
The variables z and w are constants that signify the cost of an
investigation and warrant, respectively. An investigation is costly
because of opportunity costs and the use of law enforcement re-
sources. Warrants are directly costly to obtain because of the time
and resources necessary to obtain a warrant and are also indirectly
costly—that is, they are costs that exist because of the warrant
requirement, rather than the cost of acquiring a warrant. These
indirect costs are twofold: First, some prospective investigations will
be foreclosed due to the probable cause requirement necessary to
procure a warrant. Second, there is the possibility that evidence will
be destroyed during the warrant application process.190 We can
nonetheless group these costs together as costs of the warrant, w,
which are fixed costs of gaining a warrant—costs that do not arise
in the Nonwarrant condition.
The variable g signifies the gain to law enforcement that comes
from a conviction. This gain includes all of the societal benefits of
catching and convicting a criminal, such as the deterrence of future
190. A cost that was previously more considerable than it is now, in an era of electronic
warrants.
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crime, the punishment of past crime, and the successful return of
money or goods that were taken in a crime. Finally, ? is again the
probability that evidence will be found in an investigation and is
again conditional on the amount of innovation that the criminal has
chosen. As with the variables that make up the criminal’s expected
utility function, each of these variables is assumed to be positive.
Once again, other variables that do not change the model, such as
the probability of conviction if evidence is found in an investigation,
are omitted for simplicity.
We have made the difference between the Warrant and Nonwar-
rant conditions as simplified as possible—warrants increase the cost
for LEOs, but have no other effect. This establishes the easiest
possible test for the Police Efficiency Assumption. If we can show
that the Assumption sometimes fails under these conditions, then
it should fail more often under more complex conditions in which
the warrant requirement also changes criminal incentives directly.
C. Game-Theoretic Solutions
We need to adopt a solution form that captures the simultaneous
dynamic of criminal innovation and law-enforcement response,
given that a criminal’s utility depends not only upon his own
decision whether to innovate, but also upon the decision of LEOs to
investigate, and vice versa. Game theory is the study of situations
in which the results of a person’s actions depend not only on her
own decisions, but also upon the decisions of others.191 It defines the
best strategy of each party for every possible choice, given the
expected action of the other party.192
Broadly speaking, games can be either sequential or simulta-
neous. In a sequential game, one player chooses her action before
the second player, and the second player knows what the first play-
er chose. In a simultaneous game, both players choose their actions
at the same time, with no knowledge of what the other has chosen.
In the real world of criminal innovation, of course, a criminal will
make the decision whether to innovate before LEOs decide whether
to investigate. However, often the LEO will also not initially know
191. See OSBORNE, supra note 176.
192. See supra Part II.A.
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whether the criminal has masked his crime through innovation; the
LEO thus cannot base her investigation decision on the criminal’s
innovation decision, and the criminal will not know whether law
enforcement is likely to investigate. Therefore, the game ought to be
modeled as a simultaneous game because even though the criminal
actually makes his decision first, the players might as well have
made their decisions simultaneously.
Here, there are two separate games: one for the Warrant con-
dition, and one for the Nonwarrant condition. In the latter, LEOs do
not need to pay the cost w of obtaining a warrant if they decide to
investigate. The two players in the game are the criminal and the
law-enforcement agency. Each has two possible actions: the criminal
can innovate or not innovate; law enforcement can investigate or not
investigate. The solution maps the response of each player for each
possible set of actions of the other. For instance, the criminal can
adopt a strategy to innovate regardless of what law enforcement
does—hence the (Innovate, Investigate) and (Innovate, Not Invest-
igate) options in Figure 2.193 We look at the utilities associated with
such a choice and predict the outcome for each player, given the
likely response. Both actors attempt to maximize their own expected
utility, but must keep in mind the decisions of the other actor when
doing so.
From interpreting the games in the Warrant and Nonwarrant
conditions, we can determine if (or how often) the criminal will in-
novate and LEOs will search, depending on the other variables in
the model. To do so, it is necessary to determine the Nash equilibria
for each game. A Nash equilibrium occurs when both players are
playing the best possible response they can, given the actions of the
other player.194 For example, (Innovate, Not Investigate) is a Nash
equilibrium if (a) the criminal is better off innovating than not inno-
vating, assuming that LEOs do not investigate, and (b) law enforce-
ment is better off not investigating than investigating, assuming
that the criminal innovates. We find the solutions to the game by
finding the Nash equilibria: only outcomes that are Nash equilibria
should arise, because outside that equilibrium, by definition at least
193. The first part of the parenthetical is the criminal’s action, and the second part is the
action of police.
194. MORROW, supra note 175, at 80. 
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one player will be better off by unilaterally changing his or her
strategy.195 A game can have one Nash equilibrium, many, or
none.196 Thus, the solution to the game does not tell us the only
possible course of action; rather, it tells us the possible outcomes.
There are two types of Nash equilibria. The example of (Innovate,
Not Investigate) is a “pure strategy Nash equilibrium” because each
player will definitely play a particular action in this equilibrium.197
A game may also have “mixed strategy Nash equilibria,” in which
one or both players, rather than choosing one definite action, choose
between different actions based on a probability distribution over
the player’s possible actions.198 For example, there could be a mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium in which the criminal innovates with a
probability of one-third (and does not innovate with a probability of
two-thirds), and in which LEOs investigate with a probability of
three-fourths (and do not investigate with a probability of one-
fourth). Conceptually, this means that LEOs do not know whether
the criminal will innovate; however, for a given probability that the
criminal will innovate, they have a best response, which may itself
be probabilistic. By finding the Nash equilibria in these two games,
it is possible to determine when the Police Efficiency Assumption
does not hold. The assumption will fail if, for a given set of parame-
ters, law-enforcement utility in the Nash equilibrium under the
Warrant condition is greater than or equal to law-enforcement
utility in the Nash equilibrium under the Nonwarrant condition.
We now present the Nash equilibria, with brief intuitive explana-
tions of what they each contain. The next Section describes in more
detail the substantive meaning and significance of each possible
outcome, and our overall results. There are three possible pure
Nash equilibria in the warrant world. Only one of the equilibria can
195. See id. at 81 (“A Nash equilibrium is stable because neither player has an incentive
to deviate unilaterally from its equilibrium strategy.”). Some scholars have argued that Nash
equilibria are not in fact accurate predictions of human behavior. See, e.g., George J. Mailath,
Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory, 36 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 1347, 1347-48 (1998); Rosemarie Nagel, Unraveling in Guessing Games: An
Experimental Study, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1313, 1325 (1995). However, they are more likely to
be accurate when games are repeated multiple times, as will be the case with the police and
criminals. Mailath, supra, at 1353; Nagel, supra, at 1325.
196. See OSBORNE, supra note 176, at 23-24.
197. See ORDESHOOK, supra note 163, at 118.
198. See id. at 133.
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actually occur at a time; which one will occur will depend on the
values of different variables within the model.
(Innovate, Investigate) is a Nash equilibrium if c<?H-?L and
w+z<g?L. Intuitively, this is when the cost of innovation is less
than the resultant expected gain in reduced detection and
punishment, and when the expected gains to law enforcement
from investigating are larger than the fixed costs of the investi-
gation and warrant.
(Not Innovate, Investigate) is a Nash equilibrium if c >?H -?L and
w + z< g?L. Intuitively, this is different from the first equilibrium
in that the gains from innovation are now smaller than the cost.
(Not Innovate, Not Investigate) is a Nash equilibrium if
g?H>w+z, meaning that the gain to law enforcement from invest-
igating is smaller than the costs, even if the criminal does not
innovate.199 
Note that the outcome (Innovate, Not Investigate) is never a
Nash equilibrium because if LEOs are not going to investigate,
the criminal would be better off not innovating.
There is also one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in the warrant
condition: The criminal innovates with probability ,? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?1H L H w zg
and LEOs investigate with probability . This Nash equilib-? ? ?? ?cH L
rium occurs when c<?H -?L and g?L <w+z<g?H. Intuitively, this
means that LEOs will mix strategies when the cost of investigating
is in between the expected utility that they receive if the criminal
does innovate and does not innovate,200 and once again that the
criminal will innovate when the cost of innovation is less than the
resultant expected gain in reduced detection and punishment.
199. The criminal prefers to innovate if LEOs investigate only if c<?H- ?L. Likewise, LEOs
prefer to investigate if the criminal innovates if g? H >w + z. (Innovate, Not Investigate) is not
an equilibrium: If LEOs do not investigate, the criminal will choose not to innovate, because
b>b-c.
200. Thus, the criminal will mix if EUc(Innovate, Investigate) ? pp(investigate) + EUc(Inno-
vate, Not Investigate) ? [1-pp(Investigate)] = EUc(Not Innovate, Investigate) ? [1-pp(Investigate)].
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There are also four Nash equilibria in the Nonwarrant condition.
These are the same as the Warrant condition Nash equilibria,
except without the “w” warrant cost terms:
• (Innovate, Investigate) if c <?H -?L and z< g?L.
• (Not Innovate, Investigate) if c >?H -?L and z< g?L.
• (Not Innovate, Not Investigate) if g?H > z.
• The criminal innovates with probability , and? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??1H L H zg
LEOs investigate with probability  when c <?H -?L and? ? ?? ?cH L
g?L < z< g?H.
D. When Is the Assumption Violated?
The Police Efficiency Assumption is violated if, for a given set of
constants (z, w, c, g, ?L, and ?H), the expected utility of law enforce-
ment under the Nonwarrant condition is not greater than it is under
the Warrant condition, as is commonly assumed and used to justify
nonapplication of the warrant requirement. This Section shows that
the Assumption sometimes fails—sometimes law enforcement does
not benefit from its ability to conduct warrantless searches, or from
an investigation not being considered a Fourth Amendment search
at all. Here we show when the Assumption will fail, when it will not,
and argue that the circumstances when the Assumption fails are
likely to be quite significant.
We begin with two simple outcomes—one in which the Assump-
tion holds, and one in which it fails—in order to illustrate the logic,
before considering more complex scenarios. Consider the circum-
stance in which (Innovate, Investigate) is the Nash equilibrium
under both the Warrant and the Nonwarrant condition. If we were
to move from the Warrant condition to the Nonwarrant condi-
tion—for instance, if the law became less stringent for law
enforcement—LEOs would face lower costs because they would not
have to bear the costs of seeking a warrant. Furthermore, because
the criminal is already innovating under this set of strategies, LEOs
would also encounter no greater difficulty in finding evidence. Thus,
the Assumption is not violated: elimination of the warrant require-
ment would simply lower law-enforcement costs.
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In contrast, if (Not Innovate, Not Investigate) is the equilibrium
in both conditions, the Assumption is violated. Under both scenar-
ios, LEOs receive utility of zero because they do not investigate.
Doing away with the warrant requirement does the officers no good
if they are not going to investigate even without the costs of a
warrant. This example is not very informative about the effect of
warrants on innovation and law-enforcement investigation because
in this scenario neither investigation nor innovation ever takes
place; but other equilibria that violate the Assumption have more
significance.
More significantly, the Police Efficiency Assumption is violated if
the Nash equilibrium is a mixed strategy in both of the conditions.
The mixed strategy will be a Nash equilibrium under both condi-
tions if c<?H -?L and g?L <z<w+z<g?H. The latter term requires
that w<gaH-z and . If the Nash equilibrium in both conditionszg H L? ?? ?
is mixed, we can test the Assumption by determining when the
expected utility of law enforcement in the Warrant condition is
greater than or equal to the expected utility in the Nonwarrant
condition, with both actors mixing with the probabilities given by
the equilibrium. It turns out that in this mixed Nash equilibrium,
LEOs gain no benefit from not having to obtain warrants.
The Assumption failing whenever a mixed strategy is the
equilibrium in both conditions is a very significant result, as we can
expect this to be a very common outcome. Most pure strategy Nash
equilibria are somewhat artificial: it is quite obvious that the
criminal may be better off innovating if LEOs are going to investi-
gate, but they will not bother incurring the cost of innovating if
LEOs are not going to investigate. But because the criminal will
have to make that decision without knowing what LEOs will do, he
will usually be better off varying his strategy, that is, playing a
mixed strategy. Similarly, if criminals generally know that LEOs
will always investigate when they innovate, the criminals will have
an advantage; therefore, LEOs will be better off varying their
approach, and playing a mixed strategy. In combination, the
outcome will be a mixed strategy equilibrium. Thus, in reality, we
would expect mixed equilibria to be the most common result in the
criminal innovation-police response game. This first result shows
that in this common situation, LEOs will not benefit from their
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ability to investigate without a warrant—that is, a warrant
requirement will not impede police efficiency.
The second significant result of our model is that the Assumption
is also violated in a switch from the pure strategy equilibrium (Not
Innovate, Not Investigate) to the mixed equilibrium. When mixing,
the police will have an expected utility of zero—the same as when
they do not investigate.201 This situation will occur when c<?H -?L
and g?L <z<w+z<g?H. Conceptually, this result shows that
criminals will increase their innovation when LEOs do not have to
obtain a warrant.
We argue that the failure of the Assumption in these circum-
stances is not a fluke that occurs only rarely when the variables just
happen to align in a certain way. Rather, the circumstances in
which the Assumption fails likely characterize a large percentage of
potential law-enforcement investigations. This becomes clear once
one considers what having a mixed Nash equilibrium means in this
police-criminal interaction. For the criminal, it means that innovat-
ing is worth its cost when he is certain that LEOs will investigate,
but innovating is not worthwhile if LEOs are definitely not going to
investigate. Obviously, the criminal has no reason to innovate if
LEOs are not going to investigate because innovation is costly; thus
this requirement is satisfied if the innovation’s cost is less than the
gain to criminals in detection reduction. This is likely to be the case
in many circumstances, and only would rule out innovations that
are costly yet bring few gains. We discuss specific applications of
this conclusion in the next Part. For LEOs, the mixed Nash
equilibrium simply means that LEOs would find it worthwhile to
search if they were sure the criminal did not innovate, but would
choose not to search if they knew the criminal had innovated. For
the mixed Nash equilibrium to hold in both scenarios, this cost-
benefit relationship would have to hold both with and without the
cost of the warrant included. Again, this seems likely to be true in
201. If LEOs get zero utility from mixing—the same that they would get from never
investigating—why do they ever investigate? They mix because ceasing investigations
altogether would create an unstable situation that would lead back to the mixed equilibrium.
If LEOs stop investigating, the criminals will stop innovating. But because the probability of
finding evidence then rises, LEOs will sometimes start investigating—putting us back where
we started.
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many real-life cases, in which criminal innovation can turn a worth-
while law-enforcement investigation into a losing proposition.
We can generalize our results rather than viewing them in terms
of moving from one equilibrium to another. The Police Efficiency
Assumption is violated under the following conditions:
(1) c<?H-?L and g?L<z<w+z<g?H.
This first result means that the Assumption is violated when,
for the criminal, the cost of innovation is less than the difference
between the high and low probability that LEOs will find a
particular piece of evidence if they investigate; and for LEOs, the
cost of obtaining a warrant and investigating are greater than
the gains of a search that is unlikely to be successful and less
than the gains of a search that is likely to be successful.
(2) c<?H-?L and g?L<z<g?H<w+z.
This second result means that the Assumption is violated
when the cost of innovation is as described in (1); and that the
cost of an investigation without a warrant also lies in the region
described in (1). But rather than the cost of the warrant adding
to the cost of the investigation, instead this requirement holds
that the probabilistic gain of a successful search is less than the
cost of an investigation and the cost of gaining a warrant. 
Together, these two results show that the Assumption can fail
when the costs to law enforcement outweigh the benefits of a
probabilistically successful search, and also when they do not, as
long as the other requirements hold.
(3) g?H<z.
Third, the Assumption is also violated if LEOs do not search
in either condition. This means that the gains of a successful
investigation are less than the cost of investigation, which
makes it not worthwhile for LEOs to search, regardless of
whether they need a warrant.
Finally, external factors can change specific elements of the
police-criminal interaction. For instance, as technology improves, in-
novation could become less costly. Our results yield comparative sta-
tics202 that allow us to show how the likelihood that the Assumption
202. “Comparative statics is the method of analyzing the impact of a change in the para-
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is violated varies with such changes. Changes could take place that
affect the incentives of criminals, which in turn affects the incen-
tives of law enforcement. First, the Assumption is weakened as the
cost of innovation (c) decreases, because criminals are more likely
to innovate when they face lower costs. If criminals innovate more,
the chance of a successful investigation decreases, and LEOs are
less likely to investigate even without the warrant requirement.
Second, a greater innovation-created reduction in the likelihood of
LEOs finding evidence in an investigation (?H -?L) weakens the
Assumption. This could come about, for instance, as innovation
methods become more effective. Once again, that would drive
criminals to innovate more. We discuss some of the costs associated
with various electronic innovations in the next Part.
Additionally, changes could take place that affect the incentives
of LEOs more directly. First, although the cost of seeking a warrant
(w) does not determine when the Assumption is violated, it does
matter in assessing the gains of law enforcement when the Assump-
tion is not violated. If LEOs are certain to investigate in both
conditions, the extent that they are better off is determined solely
by that cost. Second, the Assumption fails when the non-warrant
cost of an investigation (z) is neither too high nor too low, relative
to the difference in a high and low likelihood of finding evidence. If
investigations become expensive enough, they will be worthwhile to
do only some of the time, warrant or not, and the Assumption fails.
Additionally, the Assumption is also violated if z is so high that
LEOs never investigate.
Overall, our findings show that the Police Efficiency Assumption
can fail under many different circumstances. That failure is not
contingent on a very specific cost of innovation or a particularly high
cost of investigation, for example, but rather hinges on the relation-
ship between the two. Most importantly, we have shown that the
only possible mixed equilibria involves the Assumption fail-
ing—which means that the Assumption is likely to fail if there is a
serious degree of uncertainty between likely responses and count-
erresponses among criminals and law enforcement. In the next Part,
meters of a model by comparing the equilibrium that results from the change with the original
equilibrium.” 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 517 (John Eatwell et al.
eds., 1998).
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we show how these theoretical results bear out in practice, and
illustrate how the uncertainty is likely to be common, and thus so
is the regular failure of the Police Efficiency Assumption.
IV. DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Our results have significant implications for current Fourth
Amendment thought. We first consider the general implications of
our findings, and we then consider the specific application of elec-
tronic privacy.
A. General Implications
First, the assumption that the job of law enforcement in catching
criminals is greatly simplified when a warrant is not required to
investigate is severely weakened when criminals can innovate. Our
results show that in many situations, law enforcement is not in fact
better off when a warrant is not required. This includes the most
likely scenario, in which LEOs will investigate sometimes, but not
all the time, in both the Warrant and the Nonwarrant conditions.
Additionally, although there are circumstances in which law
enforcement will be better off without having to obtain a warrant,
the degree to which they gain is smaller in some of these situations
if criminals are able to innovate.203 The Police Efficiency Assumption
is a key part of the balancing inquiry that courts undertake to
determine whether a warrant is required for a particular investiga-
tion.204 Our analysis shows that the weight of this Assumption in
that balance should be significantly lowered.
Second, ridding law enforcement of the necessity of obtaining a
warrant does not affect just criminals: it does great harm to people
who have not committed a crime. The Fourth Amendment is meant
to protect those who LEOs wrongly suspect. In such a case, law
enforcement and the suspect will have different information to one
another—whereas the civilian knows that she has committed no
203. Specifically, the gain to law enforcement is not diminished by innovation when they
would search with certainty in the Warrant condition; this is when (Innovate, Investigate) is
a Nash equilibrium in this condition. Law enforcement’s gain will be diminished by innovation
in a switch to or from the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
204. See supra Part I.
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crime, law enforcement will wrongfully suspect her. In that case, the
suspect—who is actually innocent—is unlikely to innovate. LEOs,
however, will be more likely to investigate in the Nonwarrant
condition because the investigation is less costly.205 Thus, without
a warranty requirement, there will be a greater number of investi-
gations of innocent suspects.206 The privacy interests of innocent
people are harmed when LEOs are not required to obtain a warrant
for an investigation.207 We have shown that the Police Efficiency
Assumption is fragile even ignoring these effects;208 considering
these important privacy ramifications weighs further against the
Assumption when determining whether an investigation should be
termed a search. We explore this in greater detail with reference to
specific applications in the next Section.
Furthermore, the weakness of the Police Efficiency Assumption
casts a further shadow on the already much-maligned reasonable
expectation of privacy test for determining whether an investigation
is a Fourth Amendment search. As noted above, the reasonable
expectation of privacy test has often been derided as circular
because the actions of law enforcement—as well as court decisions
and legislation—shape societal expectations.209 This allows the state
to gradually shift the boundaries of what law enforcement is
constitutionally allowed to do by engaging in small increases in
surveillance over time that are mild enough to avoid judicial
reproach but significant enough to change expectations.210 Reason-
able expectations of privacy also diminish over time as technology
increasingly intrudes upon private life, at least when courts allow
the use of new surveillance tools.211 As more and more surveillance
205. See supra Part I.B (noting that proponents and opponents of the warrant requirement
recognize the cost of obtaining a warrant impedes the investigation process).
206. This is a common argument made in favor of requiring warrants. See, e.g., Oren Bar-
Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1609, 1652-57 (2012);
Christopher Slobogin, Why Crime Severity Analysis Is Not Reasonable, 97 IOWA L. REV. BULL.
1, 5 (2012).
207. See, e.g., L. Rush Atkinson, The Bilateral Fourth Amendment and the Duties of Law-
Abiding Persons, 99 GEO. L.J. 1517, 1527-29 (2011) (arguing that innocent people may change
their behavior to avoid being targeted as suspects).
208. See supra Parts II.B, III.D.
209. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
210. See Jacobi, supra note 39 (noting that a reasonable expectation of privacy depends on
how frequently the police breach that expectation).
211. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 47 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
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techniques become expected, the privacy of all—criminal and non-
criminal alike—recedes. The standard response to this critique is
that such diminished privacy will make it easier for LEOs to catch
criminals, yet our analysis shows the weakness of this assump-
tion.212 In particular, although increased law-enforcement authority
to undertake warrantless investigations may decrease the amount
of crime—innovation is costly, and a need to innovate may make
committing some crimes ex ante irrational—it will in many cases
not increase the likelihood that criminals will be brought to
justice.213
Importantly, combining these last two implications means that
there will be an increased need for noncriminals to innovate.
Without the warrant requirement, with a decreasing realm of pri-
vacy and less costly law-enforcement investigations, innocent people
may face a stark choice: either acquiesce to increased law-enforce-
ment intrusion upon their privacy rights, or spend their resources
on their own “innovation.” For the innocent, such innovation
consists not of finding ways to hide incriminating evidence from law
enforcement, but rather of measures legitimately taken to protect
one’s privacy from intrusion.214 Innocent civilians may need to buy
encryption programs to protect themselves from cyber surveillance,
or a roof to protect their backyard from police helicopter video-
graphy. Of course, criminals will do the same, and LEOs will not
gain. In the next Section, we discuss how criminal and noncriminal
innovation may intensify in the new context of mass NSA searches.
We have shown that the reliability of the Police Efficiency Ass-
umption is much weaker than previously thought,215 and that
continuing to rely on it has severe adverse effects for privacy of
noncriminals.216 Accordingly, we must now consider what potential
threat to privacy will grow, rather than recede, as the use of intrusive equipment becomes
more readily available.”); Steven Penney, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Novel
Search Technologies: An Economic Approach, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 477, 483-86
(2007).
212. See supra Part II.B.
213. See supra Part III.D.
214. E.g., Doug Gross, How to Hide Your Data from Internet Snoops, CNN, http://
www.cnn.com/2013/06/18/tech/web/how-to-encrypt-email/ [http://perma.cc/JR8R-Z9Q9] (last
updated June 19, 2013, 6:47 AM).
215. See supra Part II.B.
216. See Atkinson, supra note 207.
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policy responses can be made, given our results. There are three
primary policy options stemming from the above analysis, but each
have their drawbacks.
First, courts could decide to give the Police Efficiency Assumption
less weight when deciding whether to term an investigation a search
or a nonsearch. This option is compelling because of the weakened
strength of the Assumption when criminals are able to innovate, as
well as the negative effects that terming an investigation as a
nonsearch has on innocent suspects.217 Our analysis also shows,
however, that allowing LEOs to investigate without a warrant does
make the job of law enforcement easier in a significant amount of
situations.218 Consequently, we do not recommend that the Assump-
tion should be entirely eliminated, but our results do show that the
weight accorded to it should be diminished.
Second, courts could tailor their analyses by giving the Assump-
tion less weight in situations when it is least likely to hold. Courts
could consider whether the possibility of criminal innovation, and
any potential counterresponse by law enforcement, is likely to make
the Assumption particularly unreliable. At a general level, courts
could be particularly careful about making the Assumption when
considering whether to define an investigation as a search or a
nonsearch—in contrast to recognizing an investigation as a search,
but invoking a warrant exception—because criminal innovation can
exacerbate the self-reinforcing nature of an absence of a reasonable
expectation of privacy, as described above.219 When we get into more
specific recommendations, however, this policy option becomes more
treacherous.
A variant of this more particularized scrutiny of the Police
Efficiency Assumption would be to apply it differentially for differ-
ent crimes. For example, consider a specific investigation: a canine
sniff of an air passenger’s luggage. It is possible that the cost of
preventing the detection of marijuana (through selective plant
breeding or cloaking scents) could be very different than the cost of
preventing the detection of cocaine. Thus, the Assumption could be
217. See id. (discussing ways in which innocent citizens suffer and alter behavior if
searches increase); see also supra note 207 (showing that unconstitutional searches already
take place, and that many innocent individuals are searched).
218. See supra Part III.D.
219. See supra Part II.B.
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violated when a certain type of investigation targets one crime, but
not violated when it targets a different crime. The problem with this
approach is that courts would need to undertake, albeit intuitively,
essentially the same analysis contained in Part III. Courts would
need to consider the cost of warrants, investigations, and criminal
innovations, as well as the decreased probability that police will find
evidence as a result of an innovation. But such a task would be quite
difficult for courts—formal models are an attempt to capture the
effect of various incentives, not advocate a blueprint of proposed
judicial analysis.
Nevertheless, we can ascertain general principles from the model
as to when the Assumption is more likely to hold, and use that as a
tool for particularized application. One general result is that the
Assumption is more likely to hold when the gains to law enforce-
ment of a conviction are particularly high220—or, put differently,
when the severity of the crime is high. Legal scholars commonly
argue that courts should “incorporate the severity of the crime being
investigated into determinations of constitutional reasonableness”
when deciding whether a warrantless search is reasonable, or
whether an investigation is a search at all.221 The Justices explicitly
considered whether to include seriousness of the offense in a case
last term.222 However, this type of “crime severity analysis” is con-
troversial.223 The analysis raises serious legitimacy concerns
because it means that a defendant’s rights decrease as the length of
the potential sentence he faces increases. Another problem with this
approach is that some general results of the model may point in
somewhat different directions. For instance, in addition to
demonstrating that the Assumption is more likely to hold when the
crime is more serious, the model shows that the Assumption is
220. This result occurs because the police will investigate with or without needing to obtain
a warrant, whereas the criminal will not change her innovation behavior.
221. Bellin, supra note 50, at 6; cf. Richard A. Posner, Excessive Sanctions for Govern-
mental Misconduct in Criminal Cases, 57 WASH. L. REV. 635, 645 (1982) (“The graver the
crime, the more the parties are likely to invest in the litigation process itself, and that greater
investment should increase the accuracy of the guilt-determining process.”).
222. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014). At oral argument, in analyzing
whether independent corroboration is required to stop a driver who is reportedly under the
influence, the Justices considered whether a sliding scale should apply depending on the
seriousness of the offense. Transcript of Oral Argument, Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct.
1683 (2014) (No. 12-9490).
223. See Slobogin, supra note 206, at 2.
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particularly likely to hold when warrant costs are high.224 In
contrast to the implication of the seriousness result, the implication
of this second effect suggests that making warrants easy for the
police to obtain is not necessarily the right decision.
The third and final possible policy change that could be made is
reducing the frequency of situations in which the Assumption does
not hold. One route could be to increase the cost of innovation so
that criminals will be less likely to innovate. One way to do this is
to increase punishments or increase the likelihood of convic-
tion—common proposals in economic models of crime.225 Either of
these responses, however, would make it more likely that the
Assumption will fail because the criminal will be more likely to
innovate.226 An alternative to ex post punishment of innovation is ex
ante regulation of criminal innovation through taxes.227 Taxation is
likely to be more effective than increased punishment because it
reduces both innovation and crime.228 However, ex ante taxation of
criminal innovation is very difficult because it is often impossible to
discern whether a product will be used for legitimate purposes or for
criminal innovation.229 This concern applies not only to seemingly
innocent products that can be used to cover up crimes, such as a
balaclava, but in light of our previous findings that innocents may
need to innovate in order to protect their privacy, could also apply
to products specifically designed for eluding law-enforcement
detection, such as encryption software.230 A separate problem is that
punishing innovation creates an incentive for the criminal to inno-
vate further, to cover up the initial innovation.231 Finally, raising
the costs of innovation also raises barriers to use these mechanisms
224. See supra Part III.D.
225. See, e.g., James Andreoni, Reasonable Doubt and the Optimal Magnitude of Fines:
Should the Penalty Fit the Crime?, 22 RAND J. ECON. 385-86 (1991) (critiquing maximum
punishments for decreasing the probability of conviction); Polinsky & Rubinfeld, supra note
41, at 292-93 (arguing that maximal deterrence may require increasing punishment levels for
recidivists).
226. Nussim & Tabbach, supra note 14, at 46, 56-57.
227. Id. at 48.
228. Id. at 46, 55-56.
229. Id. at 46.
230. See infra note 247 and accompanying text (noting that encryption use is so rare among
citizens that encrypted e-mails are subject to greater scrutiny by the NSA).
231. Sanchirico, supra note 151, at 1339.
2015] INNOVATION AND THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT 813
for privacy protection by innocents, as explored in detail in the next
Section.
B. Application to Private Communication in the Digital Age
This Section considers in what situations the central result of our
model—the challenge to the orthodoxy that law enforcement will
always be better off without a warrant requirement—is likely to
have a significant impact. We demonstrate that the most norma-
tively unattractive outcome, situations in which innocent individu-
als suffer from the lack of a warrant requirement yet LEOs gain
little benefit in terms of catching criminals, is increasingly likely to
arise in the digital arena. We show this by considering in detail how
some privacy-enhancing innovations actually work, and why many
are ill-suited to meeting the needs of innocents but are nonetheless
attractive to wrongdoers when warrants are not required for LEOs
to search. We first consider e-mail encryption, and its practical
limitations for the average noncriminal user. Then we describe new
alternative means of electronic identification and content masking,
such as Privnote and Snapchat. These programs offer less protection
than e-mail encryption, but are considerably more practical. This
allows us to consider what occurs when there exists a range of
options for criminal innovation. Finally, we assess how the negative
repercussions we describe compare to the privacy incursions posed
by the NSA spying program.
1. E-mail and Encryption
Although e-mail constitutes one of the central mechanisms of
modern communication for private individuals, the constitutional
privacy status of the trillions of e-mails232 sent annually in the
United States is ambiguous.233 The primary reason for the potential
232. Worldwide, over 144 billion e-mails are sent per day; North America accounts for 14
percent of worldwide e-mail users. THE RADICATI GRP., EMAIL STATISTICS REPORT, 2012-
2016—EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2-3 (Sara Radicati ed., 2012), available at http://perma.cc/ RM7A-
PWTN.
233. See Matthew J. Tokson, The Content/Envelope Distinction in Internet Law, 50 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 2105, 2110 (2009).
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lack of privacy from state incursions234 is the operation of the third-
party doctrine. Most individuals’ e-mails are sent through massive
Internet Service Providers (ISPs), such as Gmail, Hotmail, or
Yahoo.235 As such, the third-party doctrine applies, under which any
communication shared with a third party—even in a rote fashion,
such as making a bank deposit—is deemed to have been voluntarily
shared, and consequently, any expectation of privacy in the informa-
tion is lost.236 Whether the Court will follow the third-party doctrine
to this logical extreme is still untested—as discussed below, lower
courts have been split on whether the NSA trawling through
millions of e-mails is lawful, and at least one Justice has questioned
whether the breadth of the doctrine is appropriate in the digital
age.237 As precedent stands,238 however, ISP-based e-mail is unpro-
tected from state surveillance.239
Both innocents and wrongdoers who wish to keep their e-mails
private may consider potential innovations to counter the transpar-
ency of e-mail systems. The most commonly contemplated response
is encryption,240 but understanding how both e-mail systems and
encryption work reveals the impracticality of this for the average
234. The possibility exists that private individuals may be able to access this information;
this possibility likewise encourages the type of innovation we explore below.
235. Email Security and Anonymity, ANONYMOUS INTERNET COMMUNICATIONS, http://www.
anonic.org/email-security.html [http://perma.cc/ML34-SF29] (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
236. See supra notes 78-89 and accompanying text.
237. See supra note 87. However, Justice Sotomayor’s critique was already understood, yet
overridden, when Smith v. Maryland was decided. In that case, the dissenters argued that
allowing the government to access information divulged to third parties would “prove
disturbing even to those with nothing illicit to hide. Many individuals, including members of
unpopular political organizations or journalists with confidential sources, may legitimately
wish to avoid disclosure of their personal contacts.” Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 751
(1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
238. See infra notes 314-15 and accompanying text (noting that the district court that held
the NSA’s actions to be presumptively unconstitutional did so by concluding that Smith v.
Maryland no longer applied).
239. It is unclear whether avoiding using ISP-run e-mail would circumvent the application
of the third-party doctrine. For an individual to use a personalized e-mail system through her
own server typically still requires “sharing” her information with the server provider of the
website. If the Supreme Court does determine that the third-party doctrine applies to e-mails
sent through ISP systems such as Gmail, it will then have to decide whether the doctrine
applies to websites generally. 
240. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 214; NSA-Proofing: How to Hide Data from Online
Surveillance, WEEK, http://www.theweek.co.uk/technology/55423/nsa-proofing-how-hide-data-
online-surveillance [http://perma.cc/8N4W-GMGU] (last updated Oct. 3, 2013, 2:26 PM).
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e-mail user. Even after learning about the NSA’s spying program,
most ordinary e-mail users do not use encryption. In fact, use of
encryption is so rare that the NSA treats an encrypted message as
a priority for its scrutiny.241 The reason for this lack of use of
encryption is that it is costly in numerous ways. Each recipient of
each e-mail sent by the user must have the tools to decrypt any
message sent to them.242 Although this is becoming simpler for any
given relationship, with various programs being developed that use
public access keys, it is not practical for encrypting all e-mail
because the recipient must have the same program as the sender.243
Thus, although encryption may be worthwhile for specific messages
that require particular privacy—such as criminal action—it is
impractical for everyday use by ordinary users e-mailing a plethora
of recipients.
Until recently, users could not encrypt messages with standard
web-based e-mail providers, because the business model underpin-
ning those services is based on advertising, which involves content
analysis of e-mail messages.244 Typically, ISPs only encrypted out-
going traffic, not internal traffic.245 In the wake of increased public
241. Friedrich Lindenberg & Christian Stöcker, How to Encrypt Emails: Protect Yourself
from Online Snoops, SPIEGEL (Oct. 29, 2013, 4:33 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/
how-to-encrypt-emails-protect-yourself-from-online-spying-a-930665.html [http://perma.cc/
G5JE-F383].
242. Id.
243. Sue Marquette Poremba, Why You Need to Use Encrypted Email, TOM’S GUIDE (Sept.
16, 2013, 12:26 PM), http://www.tomsguide.com/us/encrypted-email,news-17510.html [http://
perma.cc/VYE3-8TND].
244. The e-mails typically traveled from the user to her ISP, to the recipient’s ISP, and
then to the eventual recipient, with only encryption at the middle stage. Consequently, even
if messages were initially encrypted, they did not stay encrypted in the ISP system. See
Danny Sears, Is Your Company’s Email Protected? How Does Email Security Really Work?,
EVERON (Nov. 19, 2010), http://www.everonit.com/techtips/small-business-computer-tips/email
-protection/ [http://perma.cc/Y8YG-9CGN]; Your Security and Privacy, GOOGLE, https : //
support.google.com/a/answer/60762?hl=en [http://perma.cc/UD2H-YMWV] (“Our systems
scan and index emails ...; this scanning is 100% automated and cannot be turned off .... [This]
enable[s] us to display contextually relevant advertising.”).
245. Ed Felten, End-to-End Encrypted GMail? Not So Easy, FREEDOM TO TINKER (Dec. 18,
2012), https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felten/end-to-end-encrypted-gmail-not-so-easy/ [http:
//perma.cc/WSD6-NW8V]. Yahoo, Google, and Microsoft now encrypt the outgoing traffic from
their servers to the user to prevent eavesdropping. John Leyden, Well Done for Flicking
Always-on Crypto Switch, Yahoo! Now Here’s What You SHOULD Have Done, REGISTER (Jan.
9, 2014), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/01/09/yahoo_always_on_crypto_unstrong/ [http://
perma.cc/PTX5-KWQF].
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demand following the NSA spying revelations, Google introduced a
mechanism of encrypting Gmail-to-Gmail messages246 and is putting
pressure on other providers to improve their encryption options by
reporting rates of encryption.247 But commentators have observed
that Google likely expects only the highly security-conscious
minority to actually utilize the encryption software, thus enabling
the continuation of its income stream.248 And this should not be
surprising, given the financial incentives of ISPs such as Google.
The reality is that Gmail is not free; users pay for it partly by
subjecting themselves to advertising and by providing Google with
useful data at the aggregate, and possibly the individual, level.249
Fully encrypting e-mails requires a very different quid pro quo.
Therefore, for Google or a competitor to fulfill the demand of the
majority of its users for encrypted e-mail in its system, it would
have to develop an alternative, viable revenue stream. Any competi-
tor would have to do so while also creating a competitive e-mail
interface—with all the complex computer algorithms and marketing
that involves—and a way of entering a market strongly dominated
by a few powerful companies.250 Even then, spam filtering would
become impossible with encryption between the user and the ISP;
users would have to be sharply protective of their privacy to give up
spam filtering.
Add to these factors various other inconveniences associated with
encryption, such as probably rendering inbox searches impossible,251
246. Seth Rosenblatt, New Chrome Extension Hopes to Demystify Encryption, CNET (June
3, 2014, 1:50 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/new-chrome-extension-hopes-to-de-mystify-
encryption/ [http://perma.cc/CGG9-8KHQ] (“Google has released a rough alpha extension for
Chrome called End-to-End.”).
247. Email Encryption in Transit, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/
saferemail/?hl=en#search=google.com. [http://perma.cc/2E94-4EFU] (last visited Feb. 22,
2015).
248. Thomas Claburn, Google Previews Gmail Encryption, INFORMATIONWEEK (June
4, 2014, 3:26 PM), http://www.informationweek.com/mobile/mobile-business/google-previews-
gmail-encryption/d/d-id/1269433 [http://perma.cc/6Y54-JUX4].
249. Yasha Levine, Google and Encryption: Why True User’s Privacy is Google’s Biggest
Enemy, PANDO DAILY (Jan. 27, 2014), http://pando.com/2014/01/27/google-and-encryption-why-
true-user-priacy-is-googles-biggest-enemy/ [http://perma.cc/DU8H-9US4].
250. As of late 2012, over 95 percent of Americans used either Yahoo, Gmail, or Hotmail
for e-mail service. See Rani Molla, Gmail Finally Beats Hotmail, According to Third-Party
Data, GIGAOM (Oct. 31, 2012, 10:38 AM), http://gigaom.com/2012/10/31/gmail-finally-beats-
hotmail-according-to-third-party-data-chart/ [http://perma.cc/KL7A-EC8Z]. 
251. Conner Forrest, Google’s End-to-End Gmail Encryption: An Excellent Development
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and ordinary consumers are likely to come out on the non-use end
of e-mail encryption. There is an inherent trade-off between security
of encryption and ease of use,252 so it is not surprising that private
individuals rarely use encryption for e-mails.253 This illustrates why
our result that the loss of privacy for innocent individuals in cutting
back on the warrant requirement—in order to promote the often
illusory end of police efficiency—will be difficult to combat with
innovation. Yet this is not likely to be the case for innovation by
criminals, either for cybercrime or for electronically conveying
information about nonelectronic crimes.
With the warrant requirement, the gains of masking e-mails
pertaining to high-risk, high-reward criminal activity may consis-
tently overcome the costs of innovation. The warrant requirement
would simply add additional costs to law-enforcement investigation,
because such criminals would innovate either way. For lower-grade
crimes—particularly for ongoing criminal enterprises involving
multiple contacts with multiple recipients, such as drug dealing at
the end distribution stage—the same costs that arise for the
innocent individual will apply to the small-time crook who needs to
contact multiple clients or co-conspirators. The existence of the
warrant requirement, with its associated perception that police will
be restricted in their ability to conduct fishing expeditions by the
need to establish probable cause prior to searching, may lead the
marginal, cost-sensitive criminal to avoid incurring the costs of
encryption. So in some cases, with the warrant requirement, crim-
inals will innovate using encryption, and at other times it will not
be worthwhile. Either way, as shown in our model, this could result
in LEOs not searching, LEOs investigating and the criminal
innovating, or LEOs investigating and the criminal not innovating.
All three outcomes are Nash equilibria. So with the warrant
for the Enterprise, TECHREPUBLIC (June 5, 2014, 12:23 PM), http://www.techrepublic.com/
article/googles-end-to-end-gmail-encryption-an-excellent-development-for-the-enterprise/
[http://perma.cc/57MN-DVS9].
252. Id. (“PGP [Pretty Good Privacy encryption] email is notoriously not usable .... It's very,
very secure but, like a lot of things that are very, very secure, it's real easy to make mis-
takes.”).
253. See Patrick Lambert, Email Encryption: Using PGP and S/MIME, TECHREPUBLIC
(July 11, 2013, 11:00 PM), http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/it-security/email-encryption-
using-pgp-and-s-mime/ [http://perma.cc/F4MK-9Y3M].
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requirement, both positive and negative outcomes will occur in
terms of effective law enforcement.
Those negative outcomes in which the criminal gets away with his
crime, however, may occur more often when there is no warrant
requirement. Without the warrant requirement, criminals will not
have any expectation of warrant protection, and using e-mail
encryption will be sensible in many more cases. This will negatively
impact the capacity of law enforcement to catch criminals. Contrary
to popular belief, although the NSA can break most encryption
programs,254 it is practically impossible for regular police to break
encryption programs.255 To understand why, it is necessary to briefly
explain how encryption works.
Encryption is generally achieved by multiplying two extremely
large prime numbers (the factors), to create an even larger number
(the product).256 The factors are the keys to the product, which is the
lock; because both factors are prime numbers, there is only one
solution to open the lock.257 The larger the factors used, the harder
it is to decrypt them; if the resulting product is large enough, it does
not matter if it is publicly available as long as the factors remain
hidden.258 This is because it takes considerably less time and
computing power to generate the product—to encrypt—than to
reverse-engineer the factors—to decrypt.259 Even confirming that an
extremely large number is prime takes the world’s most powerful
computers a long time. For instance, the largest prime number yet
found has over seventeen million digits and took thirty-nine days of
continuous computing calculation to initially verify.260
254. See Adam Clark Estes, The NSA Can Beat Almost Any Type of Encryption, GIZMODO
(Sept. 5, 2013, 3:39 PM), http://gizmodo.com/the-nsa-can-crack-almost-any-type-of-encryption-
1258954266 [http://perma.cc/V22X-XRT4].
255. See, e.g., Zeljka Zorz, Police Unable to Decrypt iPhones, Asks Apple to Do It, HELP NET
SECURITY (May 13, 2013), http://www.net-security.org/secworld.php?id=14899 [http://perma.cc/
L3WK-XTVQ].
256. See Casey Johnston, Ask Ars: Why Spend Time and Money Finding New Prime
Numbers?, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 14, 2013, 8:30 AM), http://arstechnica.com/science/2013/02/
ask-ars-why-spend-time-and-money-finding-new-prime-numbers/ [http://perma.cc/JT7T-
4NAV].
257. See id.
258. See id.
259. See id.
260. See Casey Johnston, Volunteer Discovers a New 17 Million-Digit Prime Number, ARS
TECHNICA (Feb. 5, 2013, 5:10 PM), http://arstechnica.com/science/2013/02/volunteer-discovers-
2015] INNOVATION AND THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT 819
Nevertheless, encryption codes can be cracked—it just takes
considerable computing power. “Brute force decryption” can reverse-
engineer the factors by simply dividing the product by every lower
number until the solution is found; but the strength of the key is a
product of the number of digital bits it uses.261 Whereas previously,
a 40-bit key was the gold standard, that could now be “cracked in
moments by a standard desktop computer. These days, 256 bits or
more (which theoretically should take thousands of years to crack)
is common.”262
The quote above illustrates two important elements at work here.
First, decryption is not a practical option for the average police
investigation. With enough computing power, encryptions can be
cracked in less than 1000 years, but that would cost millions of
dollars in computing technology.263 Brute force decryption will real-
istically only be available to high-end agencies like the NSA for
responding to highly salient threats, such as a potential terrorist
attack. Consequently, encryption will protect lower-grade criminals
far more effectively than the warrant requirement.264 As such, if
courts are concerned with police efficiency, in such instances they
would be better off retaining the warrant requirement, in order to
avoid making such effective criminal innovations worthwhile.
That does not mean that innovation in the form of encryption is
always a dominant strategy. The speed with which old encryption
programs can now be cracked illustrates the second important ele-
ment: the development of encryption and decryption technology, like
most criminal innovation and law-enforcement counter-response, is
a back-and-forth of innovation and counter-innovation.265 For in-
stance, acoustic cryptanalysts have recently discovered that encryp-
tion keys can be ascertained by simply listening to a computer
a-new-17-million-digit-prime-number/ [http://perma.cc/4YKS-UJKG]. 
261. See Charles Arthur, How Internet Encryption Works, GUARDIAN (Sept. 5, 2013, 3:19
PM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/sep/05/how-internet-encryption-works
[http://perma.cc/RBA6-SCL5].
262. Id.
263. See Estes, supra note 254.
264. See Timothy B. Lee, NSA-Proof Encryption Exists. Why Doesn’t Anyone Use It?, WASH.
POST WONKBLOG (June 14, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/
06/14/nsa-proof-encryption-exists-why-doesnt-anyone-use-it/ [http://perma.cc/K8SS-JT6U].
265. Encryption also may not be the dominant strategy for a less complicated reason: if the
police gain access to the key, then “the user’s email becomes about as secure as a house with
the keys left on the doorstep.” Lindenberg & Stöcker, supra note 241.
820 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:759
decrypt an encryption program.266 Cryptanalysts were able to
extract even 4096-bit keys from a laptop in less than an hour.267 But
cryptanalysts soon discovered that this innovation, in turn, could be
undermined by various noise-creation mechanisms.268 Clearly then,
as with so many criminal innovations and law-enforcement counter-
responses, the success of the cryptanalysts in breaking down, and
then building up, the effectiveness of encryption programs in such
a short space of time “merely starts an arms race between the
blinders and the spies.”269
Consequently, the cost-benefit equation of investing in this type
of technology is constantly changing, as is the relative power
between criminals and investigators. This uncertainty in technologi-
cal parity perpetuates the uncertainty for criminals as to whether
LEOs will be able to effectively investigate,270 as well as the
corresponding uncertainty of LEOs as to whether criminals will
innovate with new techniques. Consequently, we will regularly find
ourselves in the scenario of probabilistic strategies being played.
Our model showed that in this common scenario, perverse incen-
tives arise: law enforcement will not be better off without the
warrant requirement, and the general public will have a significant
loss of privacy for no real gain in law enforcement.
This criminal innovation-police counterresponse was starkly
illustrated after Google’s announcements that it was enabling full
encryption of cell phones.271 The director of the FBI, James B.
Comey, warned that such encryption technologies would stymie law
enforcement investigations, as criminals inevitably make use of the
technology. As such, the government may legislate and regulate—in
266. See Unsafe and Sound: Ciphers Can Now Be Broken by Listening to the Computers
That Use Them, ECONOMIST (Jan. 18, 2014), available at http://perma.cc/Q5SF-M3ZW
[hereinafter Unsafe and Sound] (“Acoustic cryptanalysis works by listening to a computer’s
sonic signature—the noise its capacitors and coils make as they vibrate in response to the
amount of power being drawn by its processor.”).
267. See id. Similarly, “hackers have begun to use the power of modern graphics processing
units ... to crack passwords.” Arthur, supra note 261. This is possible because graphics
processing units are designed to do one thing very quickly, unlike computers, which are
designed to do many things relatively slowly.
268. See Unsafe and Sound, supra note 266.
269. See id.
270. See Zorz, supra note 255.
271. David E. Sanger & Brian X. Chen, Signaling Post-Snowden Era, New iPhone Locks
Out N.S.A., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2014, at A1.
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laws akin to the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement
Act of 1994, which forces telecommunications companies to build
wiretap capacity into their systems—to enforce encryption bypass
mechanisms, to unlock e-mail and other documents. However,
commentators worry that such bypasses would also be available to
hackers and foreign governments272—the fear is that in seeking to
promote police efficiency, the state may lower not only privacy but
national security.
Even greater problems arise with stronger forms of encryption,
such as masking the user’s identity and location by rerouting each
person’s Internet activities through a system such as Tor.273 The
advantage of Tor is that it is, at least currently, almost unbreakable,
even by the NSA.274 Although Tor is suitable for individual criminal
activity, such as visiting the Silk Road to purchase narcotics, much
like e-mail encryption, Tor is not a feasible alternative for daily use
by ordinary users because by encrypting all Internet activity, Tor
massively slows down the processing power of the entire machine.275
As such, all forms of encryption seem to exacerbate, rather than
solve, the problem raised by our model that innovation will offer
little help to innocent users conducting ordinary electronic activity.
272. David E. Sanger & Matt Apuzzo, F.B.I. Director Hints at Action as Google and Apple
Lock Up Cellphone Data, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2014, at A19.
273. Tor prevents Internet surveillance done through “traffic analysis”—inferring who is
talking to whom over a public network by the source and destination of Internet traffic—by
distributing each Internet communication over several randomly selected relays. See Tor:
Overview, TOR, https://www.torproject.org/about/overview [http://perma.cc/MMT5-FB6E] (last
visited Feb. 22, 2015). Other mechanisms include “full disk encryption,” which encrypts the
contents of an entire hard drive, making it impossible for investigators to access the contents.
See Eoghan Casey et al., The Growing Impact of Full Disk Encryption on Digital Forensics,
8 DIGITAL INVESTIGATION 129, 129 (2011). Another option is PGP, “Pretty Good Privacy,”
which is inconvenient because it requires the sharing of private keys, but which would hide
data from even the NSA’s spying techniques. See Lee, supra note 264. In a new twist on an
old technology, the Zetas Mexican drug cartel has been using an encrypted radio network
since 2006. See Spencer Ackerman, Radio Zeta: How Mexico’s Drug Cartels Stay Networked,
WIRED (Dec. 27, 2011, 3:41 PM), http://www.wired.com/2011/12/cartel-radio-mexico/ [http://
perma.cc/VB75-3YAB].
274. See Grant Gross, Report: NSA Has Little Success Cracking Tor, COMPUTERWORLD
(Oct. 4, 2013, 5:52 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9242992/Report_NSA_has_
little_success_cracking_Tor [http://perma.cc/QNH7-EL8H].
275. See Patrick Lambert, Everything You Need to Know About Using TOR, TECHREPUBLIC
(June 28, 2013, 4:00 AM), http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/it-security/everything-you-need-
to-know-about-using-tor/ [http://perma.cc/KM9C-N57B].
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Encryption will only offer real benefit to criminals with more at
stake in avoiding law-enforcement sanctions.
2. Data Destruction Programs
Encryption has been around in various forms for millennia,276 so
it is not surprising that it is the most commonly promoted response
to e-mail violability.277 Although there are significant moral hazards
impeding the ISP market from meeting the demand for increased e-
mail privacy protection, the broader online market has responded
to demand for private communication in other ways. One response
has been to design new technology that promotes privacy by the
fleeting nature of its mode of communication—by destroying any
record of communication, it becomes more difficult, though not
impossible, for a third party to access the information.
One such program is Privnote, which offers the modern realiza-
tion of the self-destruct message imagined in futuristic spy dramas,
such as Mission Impossible. It passes encrypted messages between
two individuals; the messages are sent as single-use URLs that
expire after the first time they are accessed in any web browser.278
The message creator crafts a note and sends the URL to the
recipient, who clicks on the URL and reads the information and
then the message is automatically destroyed. This system offers
both practical and legal mechanisms of ensuring privacy as against
state interception.
Practically, the system provides security against surveillance by
destroying the message once it is read. Not even the sender or initial
recipient can ever view the note again, because the link will no long-
er exist.279 Of course that does not entirely replicate the scenario in
which the message never existed. For example, the recipient could
take a screenshot of the message before it is destroyed. However,
trust in the recipient is unavoidable in almost any communication
276. See The History of Encryption, VISUAL.LY (May 3, 2012), http://visual.ly/history-
encryption [http://perma.cc/3YKV-M4Y6].
277. See Lambert, supra note 253.
278. See Privacy Policy, PRIVNOTE, https://privnote.com/privacy/ [http://perma.cc/9P84-
6JYG] (last visited Feb. 22, 2015).
279. See FAQ, PRIVNOTE, https://privnote.com/faq/ [http://perma.cc/4KZJ-5XXL] (last visited
Feb. 22, 2015).
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mechanism—as the Supreme Court has recognized280—particularly
recorded messages.281 In addition, though, the message could be
intercepted and read by someone other than the intended recipient,
such as by the government. Because the message takes the form of
a URL, if a third party obtained knowledge of where to look, that
third party could potentially read the message before the intended
recipient.282 In this scenario, although Privnote cannot prevent
interception, the system enables the sender to detect it. Because the
message is destroyed after being opened, only one person can view
it. Although the sender cannot tell if it was the intended recipient
who read the message, the sender can inferentially determine that
fact by the recipient’s subsequent inability to access the message.
The act of interception destroys the message, leaving only a dog that
cannot bark. Thus, Privnote seems well designed for both avoiding
and detecting government eavesdropping.
Legally, Privnote also may offer the benefit of avoiding the appli-
cation of the third-party doctrine. Unlike e-mail ISPs, the Privnote
platform does not hold the content of the messages sent on its server
in any readable format at any time.283 The decryption key for each
message is bound to the content through the link and the link is
never sent to Privnote, but rather is generated in the user’s
browser.284 However, the messages themselves are stored on the
Privnote servers prior to being read.285 It is questionable whether it
is possible for anyone with access to the Privnote database, such as
an employee, to access the content of the messages—even those with
access to the database do not have the keys to decrypt individual
280. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (“Inescapably, one contemplating
illegal activities must realize and risk that his companions may be reporting to the police.”).
281. There are reports of nude Snapchat photos being screenshot and then forwarded as
a form of pornography. See Alexis Kleinman, Snapchat Nudes Are Being Screenshot and
Secretly Posted on Facebook, HUFFINGTON POST (May 29, 2013, 3:08 PM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/28/snapchat-nudes_n_3348145.html [http://perma.cc/8DNM-
J7QB].
282. See Privacy Policy, supra note 278 (“Depending on the communication channel of your
choice (e.g., email, fax, SMS, phone, instant messaging), there may be a certain risk that third
parties intercept your communication, get knowledge of the communicated URL and thus may
be able to read your message.”).
283. Id.
284. See FAQ, supra note 279.
285. Id.
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messages.286 Also, although it is possible that Privnote could insert
code to intercept the content of the notes, the website and its creator
swear they will not do so.287 Even though these three caveats
provide qualifications on the actual capacity for privacy invasion,288
they do not adversely impact the legal privacy created by the design
of the Privnote system—as long as those running the company can
plausibly swear that they will have no access to the content of the
messages, then Privnote users have not “knowingly shared” the
content of their communications with the company that runs the
service and the third-party doctrine will not kick in.289
Thus e-mail encryption may be clunky and impractical for the
average noncriminal user aiming to protect his privacy, but more
recent innovations may offer greater protection to innocents and
wrongdoers alike from state scrutiny. But these advantages are
highly fragile, subject to the ever-changing balance of power in the
innovation-response game. That fragility is illustrated by the
experiences of a company offering a similar service to Privnote:
Snapchat.
Snapchat is a platform for sharing photos and videos, but that
sharing only lasts between one and ten seconds after viewing,
according to the sender’s preference.290 The program was designed
to create a social networking site that provides greater privacy by
making content temporary,291 but there are a number of elements
that make Snapchat less protective of privacy than Privnote.292
286. See Pablo Hoffman, How Privnote Really Works, PABLO HOFFMAN (July 6, 2008, 2:51
PM), http://pablohoffman.com/how-privnote-really-works [http://perma.cc/HX2K-F8D3].
287. See id.
288. In addition, some commentators have questioned Privnote’s claim of inability to access
the content of the messages, arguing that nothing is stopping the developers from “executing
additional code to intercept notes before they’re encrypted.... [A]s long as they continue to
claim that they can’t possibly read the contents of the notes being passed through their
system, they’re lying.” Ryan Grove, Privnote’s Developers Are Confused, WONKO.COM (July 6,
2008, 7:11 PM), http://wonko.com/post/privnotes-developers-are-either-stupid-or-malicious
[http://perma.cc/UHC8-ZCDG].
289. In addition, because Privnote does not log IP addresses, see FAQ, supra note 279, it
cannot deduce the identity of any sender, and thus it may be harder for agencies, such as the
NSA, to obtain a subpoena for user-identification records.
290. Larry Magid, What Is Snapchat and Why Do Kids Love It and Parents Fear It
(Updated), FORBES (May 1, 2013, 4:14 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrymagid/2013/05/
01what-is-snapchat-and-why-do-kids-love-it-and-parents-fear-it/ [http://perma.cc/UR7J-F3Z8].
291. Id.
292. Other websites, even those primarily used for anonymous sexual hookups, such as
2015] INNOVATION AND THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT 825
Unlike Privnote, Snapchat delivers messages to individuals on a
sender’s friends list;293 thus, the platform has user and communica-
tion identification capability. Although Snapchat claims to automat-
ically delete all photos from its servers such that they can no longer
be retrieved by anyone for any reason,294 forensic analysts have
actually determined that photos can be “undeleted.”295 In addition,
the messages are saved on Snapchat’s servers for up to thirty days
(if unopened),296 meaning that users have actually relayed the
content of the messages to the company. Moreover, Snapchat intro-
duced a feature that allows a once-a-day exception for certain
recipients, granting them limited playback for up to twenty-four
hours. Finally, perhaps as a result of Snapchat’s popularity,297 the
app Snaphack has been developed that lets people look at old
snapchats; it is expected that there will soon be a version that will
allow forwarding to third parties.298 These are exactly the sort of
capabilities that justified the third-party doctrine in the first
Grindr, which are likely also being used for prostitution, nonetheless offer even less
protection: Grindr keeps significant amounts of information about its users and shares it with
third parties. It even retains the instant messages sent through the app, including (often
explicit) pictures, location, and audio/video. Grindr Terms of Service, GRINDR, http://grindr.
com/terms-of-service [http://perma.cc/LTF2-LRE5] (last visited Feb. 2, 2015).
293. See How to Find and Add Friends, SNAPCHAT, https://support.snapchat.com/a/find-
friends [http://perma.cc/84F5-33KR] (last visited Feb. 2, 2015).
294. How Snaps Are Stored and Deleted, SNAPCHAT (May 9, 2013, 7:23 PM), http://blog.
snapchat.com/post/50060403002/how-snaps-are-stored-and-deleted [http://perma.cc/FX2K-
MKDQ].
295. Kashmir Hill, Snapchats Don’t Disappear: Forensics Firm Has Pulled Dozens of
Supposedly-Deleted Photos from Android Phones, FORBES (May 9, 2013, 4:51 PM), http://www.
forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/05/09/snapchats-dont-disappear/ [http://perma.cc/DJ9V-
E9BQ] (“[I]t’s possible to pull Snapchat photos from Android phones simply by downloading
data from the phone using forensics software and removing a ‘.NoMedia’ file extension that
was keeping the photos from being viewed on the device.”).
296. How Snaps Are Stored and Deleted, supra note 294. 
297. Jordan Crook, Snapchat Sees More Daily Photos Than Facebook, TECHCRUNCH (Nov.
19, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/11/19/snapchat-reportedly-sees-more-daily-photos-than-
facebook/ [http://perma.cc/79TQ-KFW9].
298. Ellie Zolfagharifard, Beware What You Snapchat: App Lets You Save and Re-Open
Pictures You Have Received Without the Sender Ever Knowing, DAILY MAIL (Oct. 14, 2013,
10:26 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2458852/Snapchat-SnapHack-App-
lets-save-open-pictures-received.html [http://perma.cc/46F9-PZF5].
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place;299 thus, Privnote’s legal advantage is unlikely to apply to
Snapchat.300
The irony of an outcome in which Privnote messages receive
greater constitutional protection than Snapchat photographs is that
wrongdoers seem much more likely to use Privnote than Snapchat.
Snapchat involves people (mostly teens) who know each other well
enough to be “friend” contacts and pass messages back and forth—a
mechanism no doubt regularly used for online sexting but also
plausibly used for everyday conversation among a generation used
to chatting online.301 Privnote, on the other hand, is designed to
maximize untraceability, enabling the sending of illicit messages.
Once again, this platform could be attractive for sexual interactions
and other noncriminal private communications, but it is inherently
well-suited to masking criminality,302 and far less convenient for
back-and-forth conversation.
Unlike e-mail encryption, which is only likely to be attractive to
serious criminals because of the high convenience costs, programs
such as Privnote and Snapchat are seemingly innately suited to
small-time criminality. They offer considerable privacy, but
primarily by keeping crime under the radar; the main way Privnote
and Snapchat protect criminality is through masking it, which will
be effective as long as LEOs do not know where to look. But these
programs offer less protection for more serious crimes, which are
subject to more thorough investigation, because the government can
request access to them: Snapchat has received warrants requesting
299. The logic of the third-party doctrine is that if an individual reveals information to a
third party, betrayal is a known risk, and thus it is no different from giving the police access
to the communication itself. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971). If Snapchats
are continually accessible, the sender has no guarantee that the recipient of a message will
not reveal its contents to the police.
300. Seemingly in recognition of the dangers encapsulated by the third-party doctrine,
Snapchat warns its users that although it will attempt to ascertain if anybody takes a
screenshot of their snap, they should not use the program if they are worried about the
recipient keeping a copy of messages. Privacy Policy, SNAPCHAT, https://www.snapchat.com/
privacy [http://perma.cc/4RVM-XT9P] (last updated Nov. 17, 2014).
301. Magid, supra note 290.
302. However, there are legitimate uses for Privnote that require strong privacy protection,
such as “web forums for rape and abuse survivors, or people with illnesses,” as well as
journalists and NGOs communicating with whistleblowers and dissidents. See Tor: Overview,
supra note 273.
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unopened images.303 These programs will be inadequate for serious
criminals, but they will be quite effective at protecting criminals
from the type of scrutiny that would allow LEOs to know where to
look. LEOs may be as well off if they had to develop probable cause
and obtain a warrant before searching a criminal’s e-mail versus if
they had no warrant requirement but, as a result of even petty
criminals turning to this kind of innovation, had to figure out which
platform a criminal was using and try to find the incriminating
messages before they were destroyed.
Without a warrant requirement, the end result may be that
programs like Snapchat, most likely to be used by noncriminals, will
receive little protection; Privnote and programs of its ilk that are
inherently amenable to small-time criminality will offer significant
protection, but be permeable; and serious criminals will use more
complex innovations, such as Tor or e-mail encryption, which will be
far more costly, but extremely hard to crack. The heightened fear of
investigation due to the lack of warrant requirement will, as our
model predicted, undermine the privacy interests of innocents, but
the main effect on criminals will be to encourage use of electronic
innovations, which may make criminal investigations as hard as the
warrant requirement would.
3. Switching Costs and the New Context: Mass NSA Searches
We have shown that whether innovations like encryption or self-
destruct messaging are feasible depends largely upon various
practicalities, such as convenience, cost, and degree of privacy
needs. For serious criminals, the heightened need to avoid detection
may outweigh even the high costs of encryption, whereas innocent
users are more likely to utilize the lower-privacy protection offered
by programs such as Snapchat. There will always be a cost-benefit
equation in the innovation-response relationship, but that calcula-
tion will depend on whether switching costs are adequately low.
For instance, if law enforcement profiles individuals who wear
black-and-white scarves because they are associated with approval
303. Amanda Holpuch, Snapchat Admits to Handing Unopened “Snaps” to US Law
Enforcement, GUARDIAN (Oct. 15, 2013, 3:35 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/ 2013/
oct/ 15/snapchat-hands-snaps-pictures-to-federal-law-enforcement [http://perma.cc/K2SD-
7LG3].
828 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:759
of terrorist methods,304 then these searches can easily be avoided by
switching apparel, perhaps with free speech costs. If the government
targets red cars for additional scrutiny because they believe these
cars are more dangerous,305 drivers can avoid such additional
scrutiny only to the extent that they can absorb the transaction
costs of switching or painting their cars. And if LEOs profile based
on an immutable characteristic such as race, then switching is
impossible.
The cost-benefit equation in the Fourth Amendment context is
made more complex than in other contexts by the circularity of
Katz’s logic. The difficulty of Katz is that its identification of an
investigation as a search is based on subjective individual and
objective social expectations of privacy; but those expectations them-
selves depend on how often and how extensively such investigations
take place. If the public knows that the government can and does
access its e-mail, its expectation of privacy in e-mail is reduced, and
the likelihood of that investigation being a search is reduced. The
lower the switching costs, the more self-reinforcing government
targeting will be.
Thus Katz encourages criminal innovation; but the possibilities
for innovation are not always unlimited. This Article has shown that
the cost-benefit equation will often be perversely related to criminal-
ity. Consequently, it will often be worthwhile for criminals to in-
novate, but, without the payoff of crime, the switching costs will be
too high for innocents, who will be left to bear the costs of additional
searches. This is illustrated by the changed context of the mass NSA
spying regime.
Pursuant to an order issued by the Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Court (FISC),306 the NSA has been capturing, siphoning,
304. Wearing the keffiya, a black-and-white checked scarf, is an expression of solidarity
with the Palestinian Liberation Organization. Sonja Sharp, Your Intifada: Now Made in
China!, MOTHER JONES (June 22, 2009, 3:34 PM), http://www.motherjones.com/riff/2009/06/
your-intifada-made-china [http://perma.cc/RC5F-JGVU].
305. Some cars are more likely to get pulled over than others, though it may be that people
who have these cars are worse drivers. Hannah Elliott, Cars Most Likely to Get a Ticket,
FORBES (Oct. 13, 2010, 5:30 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2010/10/13/cars-that-get-ticketed-
most-police-speeding-lifestyle-vehicles-violations.html [http://perma.cc/N8E2-2AS2].
306. Spencer Ackerman, FISA Court Order That Allowed NSA Surveillance Is Revealed for
First Time, GUARDIAN (Nov. 19, 2013, 10:09 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/ 2013/
nov/19/court-order-that-allowed-nsa-surveillance-is-revealed-for-first-time [http://perma.cc/
N39W-TLT8].
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storing, and cross-referencing vast swathes of personal data,
including collecting the call-detail records of all customers of the
major telecommunications companies, data mining billions of e-
mails each day, and analyzing them for patterns and connections.307
This metadata includes all “non-content” information of phone calls,
including the numbers dialed, duration of calls, and the location
information of cell phones.308 The FISC order allows the NSA to
search the database for information; no warrant is necessary—only
“reasonable suspicion” that the search will reveal information
relating to a terrorist plot. The NSA asserts that it does not even
need FISC approval, and thus presumably can bypass even
reasonable suspicion.309 As discussed, this is arguably legal under
existing Fourth Amendment doctrine, as the third-party doctrine
allows for the warrantless collection of metadata released to third
parties, such as a telephone company.310 The core of the controversy
of the NSA searches is that they alter the basic principle that the
Fourth Amendment limits law-enforcement investigation methods
by requiring specificity and reliability of law-enforcement knowl-
edge of alleged criminal conduct. This has three main repercussions.
First, switching behavior to avoid NSA surveillance is extremely
difficult, both because of the breadth of the spying program and its
lack of association between criminality and scrutiny. The fact that
the program covers most telephone conversations and e-mail com-
munications makes switching to alternative means of communica-
tion dependent on some form of technology—such as those described
307. See, e.g., How the NSA’s Domestic Spying Program Works, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUNDATION, https://www.eff.org/nsa-spying/how-it-works [http://perma.cc/4AY9-9S7N] (last
visited Feb. 22, 2015).
308. Orin Kerr, Metadata, the NSA, and the Fourth Amendment: A Constitutional Analysis
of Collecting and Querying Call Records Databases, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 17, 2013, 3:54
AM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/07/17/metadata-the-nsa-and-the-fourth-amendment-a-
constitutional-analysis-of-collecting-and-querying-call-records-databases/ [http://perma.cc/
82UJ-32P6].
309. Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012), the NSA is
supposed to convince the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court that it has reasonable
suspicion that any query of the data will reveal information relating to activities such as
terrorist plots, but the NSA interpreted this as authorizing it to spy on domestic phone calls
and e-mails without a FISC approval or a warrant. NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GEN., ST-09-0002 WORKING DRAFT 8 (2009), available at http://perma.cc/RR7T-
BRZV.
310. See supra Part I.A.
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in the previous two Sections—even the most accessible of which may
be cost-prohibitive to the less technologically savvy. We might
anticipate demand for further innovations that would interfere with
the ability of the NSA to ascertain who is being called, for example
by rerouting calls through an intermediary as Tor does with Inter-
net communication, or by rerouting telephone calls over Wi-Fi and
other channels to avoid any creation of a call log.311 These technolog-
ical fixes are currently only theoretical. Even if they eventuate, it
will create an increasingly high pressure to innovate, not only by
criminals but also by ordinary citizens.312
Second, the constitutionality of the NSA searches hinges on the
same considerations described above in relation to privacy in e-mail
and other forms of communication: the application of the third-party
doctrine. Thus far, two district courts have ruled on preliminary
injunction motions challenging the constitutionality of the spying
program, and have come to opposite conclusions.313 In the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia, Judge Leon held
that the NSA’s bulk collection of telephone metadata is likely
unconstitutional.314 Judge Leon distinguished Smith v. Maryland by
stating that it was no longer applicable to modern-day circum-
stances in which people use their telephones for much more than
making calls and the government has developed exceedingly effici-
ent techniques for storing and analyzing the metadata of millions of
people.315 The opinion struck many as incorrect: the added capabili-
ties of cellular phones arguably should not matter because the
metadata being collected by the NSA is the same that was collected
thirty-four years ago in Smith. Moreover, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly said that achieving an outcome that was previously
judicially approved in a more efficient manner does not render a
311. David Goldman, Apps Claim They Can Keep Phone Records Secure, CNN (June 6,
2013, 1:19 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/06/06/technology/security/verizon-call-logs/ [http://
perma.cc/D7V4-397Z].
312. As the head of security at Google described, “At first we were in an arms race with
sophisticated criminals .... Now we’re in an arms race with the best nation-state actors.”
Steven Levy, How the U.S. Almost Killed the Internet—and Why It Still Could, WIRED, Feb.
2014, at 62, 66.
313. ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Klayman v. Obama, 957 F.
Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013).
314. Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 9. 
315. Id. at 31-37. 
2015] INNOVATION AND THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT 831
state action unconstitutional.316 In contrast, Judge Pauley of the
Southern District of New York held that the program was constitu-
tional under the controlling precedent of Smith.317 Thus, the
unconstitutionality of the NSA searches hinges on the willingness
of the Supreme Court to overturn or massively limit Smith v.
Maryland. But if the Court is not willing to do that, then e-mail
communications and their brethren are not protected from any state
scrutiny; they will not just be subject to the relatively nonintrusive
scanning of metadata, but to individualized content analysis.
Third, and more generally, the fundamental objection that the
NSA program undermines the connection between established
criminality and level of scrutiny is not unique to that program; it is
true of all law-enforcement investigations that are categorized as
nonsearches. Although the NSA mass searches garner significant
headlines, the same effect is achieved by avoiding the warrant
requirement for ordinary police investigations. In fact, at least the-
oretically, NSA searches are subject to the restraint of reasonable
suspicion, whereas if a law-enforcement investigation is categorized
as a nonsearch, Fourth Amendment protections do not apply at all.
The NSA controversy is just a high-profile example of what the law
enforcement has long been able to do in investigations not catego-
rized as searches.
CONCLUSION
Throughout Fourth Amendment law, courts assume that
requiring law enforcement to obtain a warrant for an investigation
will greatly harm LEOs’ ability to solve crime and prosecute crimin-
als. This assumption appears in debates about the search/nonsearch
distinction, about possible exceptions to the warrant requirement,
and about the warrant requirement itself. Yet it is often not true.
In some situations, LEOs will indeed be better able to investigate
crime when they do not have to incur the costs of obtaining a
warrant. However, when criminals are able to innovate in ways that
reduce the likelihood of law-enforcement detection, requiring LEOs
316. See Orin Kerr, Preliminary Thoughts on Judge Leon’s Opinion, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(Dec. 16, 2013, 6:54 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/12/16/preliminary-thoughts-judge-
leons-opinion/ [http://perma.cc/8K6V-7ED9].
317. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 752.
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to obtain a warrant will do little or no harm to law-enforcement
investigations in many cases. Reduced costs of law-enforcement
investigation will incentivize criminals to innovate more often. This
increased innovation will often completely offset the gains LEOs
receive from not having to obtain a warrant.
Other than differences in constitutional interpretation,318 the
main argument in favor of doing away with the warrant require-
ment is that obtaining a warrant makes police work much more
difficult.319 Yet when criminal innovation is taken into account, it is
clear that this argument is greatly oversold. For too long, Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence has overlooked the fact that criminals
will work harder to hide their crimes if LEOs do not have to work as
hard to investigate them. Law enforcement has long recognized the
need to anticipate and respond to potential criminal innovation, and
investigation strategies are commonly structured around the expec-
tation that criminals will innovate. It is time the courts recognize
this interaction.
When criminal innovation is taken into account, many of the
assumptions of Fourth Amendment law become less clear, and many
of the strange doctrinal innovations that the Court has made to
account for police efficiency look foolhardy. This Article has shown
that, contrary to common beliefs, law enforcement will often realize
no gain when an investigation is classified as a nonsearch or is
otherwise exempt from the warrant requirement. These outcomes
will only occur more often as use of electronic technology increases.
Courts deciding Fourth Amendment questions must begin to take
into account the incentives that cause criminals to innovate, and
give less weight to the claim of police efficiency when deciding
whether the warrant requirement applies.
318. Amar, supra note 53, at 804-05.
319. See, e.g., Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 438 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
